



EAST AFRICA

Officer Block 2 and Enlisted Block 3

An Introduction to the East Africa Region

CENTER FOR ADVANCED OPERATIONAL CULTURE LEARNING

Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program

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Introduction

One must distinguish between the study of regions, countries, and cultures. Chapters 1 through 6 in this document introduce a region and provide some information about its countries and their relationships. They do not introduce a culture or cultures. Those chapters simply provide knowledge about the region and the environment in which people with different cultures live.

Regions and states do not have a single culture; instead they have multiple, diverse cultures. Cultures are not necessarily bound by national borders. There may be multiple cultures in a single state, while people sharing a single culture may live in more than one state.

The case study in Chapter 7 is about one specific culture in the region. Building upon the information provided in chapters 1 through 6, Chapter 7 introduces one of the many cultures in the East Africa region, using concepts discussed in the Operational Culture General document.

Why This Region is Relevant to You as a Marine

East Africa is considered a priority region for the United States because of the growing threat posed by extremist groups and terrorism. Conflict, poverty, disease, and terrorist recruitment in this region could affect U.S. homeland security. The United States is actively engaged in this region to mitigate threats to civilian and regional security.

More specifically, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) conducts training and capacity building for regional military as well as enhancing community projects around the region.¹ The region is also host to U.S. troops – Camp Lemonnier, in Djibouti, supports over 3,000 U.S. troops under the U.S. Africa Command (U.S. AFRICOM) working to advance the interests of the U.S. and its partners in the region.²

The East Africa region includes what is also referred to as the Horn of Africa (HOA). The HOA countries include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. The remainder of the region is made up of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.



Delegates from the East Africa Stand By Force (EASF) at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti (Source: AFRICOM)

Americans are generally perceived as neutral when it comes to the strategic posture of East African nations. However, the U.S. has long-term relationships with partner nations in this region, supporting efforts to stem threats.

The most significant threats in this region include Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda and South Sudan. U.S. military assistance ranges from training missions to logistical assistance and

intelligence sharing to direct strikes against Al-Shabaab targets in Somalia.

The U.S. has long been engaged in this region supporting humanitarian missions through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations (UN), notably in 1992, when the U.S. deployed 25,000 troops to support a UN humanitarian operation in Somalia under Operation Restore Hope (1992-1994). Operation Restore Hope encountered resistance as intense fighting hampered aid delivery; this resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. servicemen when two U.S. Black Hawks were shot down by hostile forces. The incident led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia.³

Troops deployed to this region under CJTF-HOA conduct civic action projects to provide water to communities in arid areas in Ethiopia and Kenya. Camp Lemonnier is also a strategic entry point for U.S. forces into Africa's landlocked countries, such as South Sudan.

Geographic Overview

Why a Geographic Overview Matters to You as a Marine

Geographic features include physical and biological factors tied to location, topography, climate, soil, environmental hazards, flora, and fauna. These features influence human and social characteristics such as beliefs, behaviors, social organization, economy, and politics, to name a few. This is not to say that geography determines how people and societies behave, but rather that it has varying effects on what they believe and do.

The locations of rivers, mountains, deserts, and coasts have great influence on where people live, what crops can be raised, and what modes of transportation are suitable. Climate and weather influence how people dress, work, and earn a living. Natural disasters like hurricanes, flooding, and earthquakes can devastate a region, and dislocate a great number of people.

Global Location


This region is referred to in this module as East Africa. The Horn of Africa (HOA), which consists of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, is a sub-region within East Africa. The remaining countries in the East Africa region include Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda. East Africa stretches about 1,800 mi (3,000 km) from north to south. Its land area is over 1.4 million sq mi (3.7 million sq km). Traveling from the capital city of Asmara, Eritrea, to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, is equal to traveling the distance between Washington, D.C. and Denver, Colorado.

The equator runs across East Africa; the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden borders this region to the east. The Indian Ocean borders Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritius, and the Seychelles Islands. The Gulf of Aden borders Djibouti and Somalia; the Red Sea borders Sudan. These three countries (Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia), along with Yemen, effectively control the *Bab-el-Mandeb*, a seaway between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The *Bab-el-Mandeb* is strategically important for the movement of oil to Asia and Europe.

This region has a population of about 322 million people in a land area of 2.4 million sq. mi (6 million sq. km), which is roughly three-fifths of the land area in the United States.⁴ By comparison, the U.S. population is approximately 319 million.⁵

Countries

- Burundi
- Djibouti,
- Eritrea,
- Ethiopia
- Kenya
- Rwanda
- Somalia
- South Sudan
- Sudan
- Tanzania
- Uganda




Map of East Africa Region (Source: Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL))

Topography

Topography has an important impact on cultural, political, and social structures in East Africa. The locations of rivers, mountains, deserts, coasts, and boundaries have contributed to population density, economic activity, and cultural diversity.

The terrain in East Africa is unique and diverse. Perhaps the most remarkable characteristic of the landscape in East Africa is the Great Rift Valley, running from northern Ethiopia to southern Mozambique. In Ethiopia, the plateau area contains a central mountain range divided by the Great Rift



Map of Eastern Africa showing Great Rift Valley and its volcanoes (in red) (Source: USGS)

Valley, which gradually descends to a coastal desert plain in Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea.⁶ This diversity of terrain ranges from high mountain peaks and plateaus, known as the highlands, to the plains of Sudan, as well as the coastal plains along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

The Great Rift Valley has active volcanic and seismic activity that produced Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika, as well as Mounts Kilimanjaro and Kenya. The *Chagga* and *Kukuyu* people believe Mount Kilimanjaro and Kenya, respectively, have a sacred role in their traditions and culture.⁷

The Ruwenzori Mountain in Uganda connects with the Virunga Ranges. The Virunga mountain ranges extend from Uganda through Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The Virunga are volcanic ranges that spread 50 mi and have 8 volcanic peaks, with the highest at 14786 ft (4,507 m).⁸ The surrounding area, known as the Serengeti Plain, is made up of plateaus and arid plains. It is located in northwestern Tanzania, and extends into southwestern Kenya. In Sudan and South Sudan, mountains in the south give way to a flat plains, culminating in deserts in the north.⁹

This region also has an abundance of rivers and lakes that are used for hydroelectric power, irrigation, fisheries, and tourism. In rural areas, people use rivers, lakes, and wells to obtain fresh water for drinking, crop irrigation, and watering livestock. In urban areas, water comes from municipal supplies. Unlike in the United States, many of the rivers in East Africa do not have bridges. Ferries carry people and vehicles across large rivers, especially the two tributaries of the river Nile; the Blue Nile in Ethiopia and White Nile in Uganda.

Lake Victoria --centrally located between Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania -- covers approximately 26,828 sq mi (69,484 sq km) and is the source of the River Nile. The Nile, a major strategic feature in this region, flows north from its source in Uganda (White Nile) through Ethiopia (Blue Nile), Sudan, and on to Egypt. Lake Victoria is also the second-largest freshwater lake in the world. Lake Tanganyika, which covers approximately 12,700 sq mi (32,892 sq km), is bordered by Tanzania and Burundi, and is the second deepest lake in the world.¹⁰

East Africa's Lakes:

Lake Victoria: Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania
Lake Tanganyika: Tanzania, Burundi
Lake Rukwa: Tanzania
Lake Kivu: Rwanda
Lake Tana: Ethiopia
Lake Turkana: Kenya, Ethiopia.

The topography of East Africa has changed over time due to deforestation, erosion, human settlement, displacement, and mining. Additionally, oil exploration in this region has altered the terrain and soil composition, forming craters and exposing the region to erosion.

Climate and Weather

East Africa straddles the equator. Much of the climate in the region is arid. The highlands of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya have relatively temperate climates. Tanzania's western plateau is hot and dry. Most of Uganda tends to have a comparatively moderate climate due to its high elevation. Desert areas in the region include northern Sudan and the coastal plain of the Horn of Africa.

Temperatures vary according to altitude and distance from the sea. The region's weather is characterized by heavy rainfall during the rainy seasons, low rainfall in arid regions, and high humidity

and heat inland.¹¹ Acclimatization to hot weather is very important while operating in this region. Of note, the temperature gets cold during the rainy seasons and at night during most of the year. This chilly temperature extreme occurs in the Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Kenyan highlands; and in the mountainous regions of South Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania.

Heavy rains could interrupt military operations and the movement of commercial because there is difficult terrain and a lack of paved roads. The amount and duration of rainfall varies in relation to altitude. East Africa's rainy seasons typically last from March to May and October to December. Spring rains are heavier and last longer, while autumn rains are brief and unpredictable. Throughout the highlands of Kenya and Uganda, rainfall is well distributed throughout the year. As a result, farmers in this region enjoy two growing seasons.¹²

The lowlands of the extreme east – Eritrea, Djibouti, and parts of Somalia – have near-desert conditions with very low rain fall. This often results in drought conditions.

Temperatures on East Africa's mountaintops can drop below zero. Kilimanjaro and other mountain peaks are snow-capped throughout the year, and glacier snow accumulates in a few of the mountain valleys.

Environmental Hazards

East Africa faces numerous environmental challenges. Environmental hazards limit access to transportation, healthcare, and educational opportunities; and influence specific societies within many countries in this region. Additionally, because this region has numerous rivers and lakes, the region is vulnerable to flooding in the rainy season. These natural disasters often have second and third order effects, including pandemic waterborne diseases, and vector-borne diseases such as malaria.

Drought

The most significant environmental events in East Africa are droughts. Expert opinions differ on the causes of persistent famine in this region. Many experts believe anthropogenic causes (the mismanagement of natural resources) have accelerated the rate of desertification in this region. However, the other main school of thought relies on scientific observations that conclude that oceanic temperatures are to blame for the shifting climatic patterns and recent droughts.¹³



Food Aid distribution in Eastern Africa (Source: USAID)

In addition to the climate conditions, food insecurity in this region has also been attributed to instability. Displaced communities across this region have for years impacted food production. The international community has come in with aid to mitigate the impact. The U.S., through USAID, is working with countries in this region to build resilience in order to mitigate, adapt to, and reduce the risks associated with drought conditions. Ethiopia is one example.¹⁴

This region is especially susceptible to instability: Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi have thousands of refugees living in neighboring countries. Kenya for instance, hosts over 300,000 refugees in a semiarid zone in its northeast area. These displaced people strain the environment and increase competition between the host communities and the refugees.

The U.S. is the largest donor of food aid to this region. In 2011, millions of dollars in food aid were funneled to the region when the UN declared a famine emergency in Djibouti, Northern Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia; impacting over 12 million people. The drought resulted in loss of life and livestock. Some drought-ravaged parts of this region have still not fully regained agricultural productivity.¹⁵

***Khamaseen* Winds**

The *Khamaseen* is a hot, cyclone-like wind common in Sudan and South Sudan during March and April. In West Africa and Central Africa, these sand storms are known as *harmattan* winds. Frequently the source of sandstorms, these oppressively hot winds blow in from the Sahara Desert carrying a fine dust that can reduce visibility to just a few feet. These winds also pose a risk to livestock and agriculture.¹⁶ In addition to posing a safety hazard during vehicle movement, these winds can also create maintenance problems for vehicles and generators.

TACTICAL TIP: Sandstorms are a safety hazard and may cause maintenance problems in vehicles, generators, and computers and other electronics, thereby impeding logistics and communication.

Poaching

This region is home to a wide array of wild animals including the ‘Big Five’ wild animals – lions, rhinoceroses, leopards, elephants and buffalo. Wildlife crime has taken a toll on the environment, especially in this region.

Poaching generally leads to the depletion of a species, which in turn impacts the region’s ecosystem – for example, the large herbivores like the rhinoceros and elephant distribute plant seeds as they move throughout their environment. Their movement affects the flora and fauna in this region. Reports indicate that one game park in Tanzania lost 67% of its elephants between 2010 and 2014. The current number of elephants in the Serengeti now stands at approximately 13,000 (from an estimated 110,000 in 1976).¹⁷



Ivory tusks seized in 2013 (Source: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)

Wildlife poaching has also given rise to corrupt cartels that bribe government officials in order to facilitate illicit trade. One example is ivory tusks to Asia. Between 2009 and 2014, there were 39 ivory seizures traced to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.¹⁸ Reports also indicate that Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Malaysia are transit points; while China is the

largest destination.¹⁹ Although there are efforts to stop the illicit trade of ivory, rhinoceros horns, and leopard skin, the threat to these animals still remains.

Deforestation

This region has long relied on timber for domestic and commercial purposes. The informal timber sector provides a living for small-scale loggers who supply local carpenters with materials for use in furniture making and other wood-based products. Most rural households use charcoal or wood for cooking, which also contributes to loggers' income from this sector. At the same time, governments have been slow to regulate logging, yet it has continued to proliferate. Unregulated deforestation has led to soil erosion, which impacts weather patterns and food security. As well as being a source for illegal timber, this region is also a destination for the sale of illegal timber from Central African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Because of the instability in the DRC, illegal timber cartels have been able to exploit porous borders and corrupt government agents to supply timber for construction to cities in this region. Additionally, due to a lack of enforcement of existing laws, illegal logging has led to the poaching of mountain gorillas. This has also had an adverse impact on tourism -- a key contributor to the gross domestic product (GDP) in this region.²⁰



Tanzania is the most vulnerable in this region having the largest forest cover (Source: SciDev.net)

Historical Overview

Why History Matters to You as a Marine

History provides a knowledge of how people, institutions, and states in a region evolved into what they are today. It also provides insights into people's collective memory about their group and others. In other words, history not only shapes a region's current affairs, but also tells us something about the historical roots of the individual and group identities of its inhabitants.

History does not predict how groups, institutions, and states in a region may behave in the future. Instead, it provides insights into what is possible and probable.

Pre-Colonization

Ancient Civilizations

Historically, East Africa served as a trade link between Africa and the Arab world. Recorded history in East Africa documents trade activity in the interior of modern-day Sudan. Sudanese traders moved goods through the Nile River Valley all the way into Egypt. The Kingdom of Kush (2686-1650 BC) was located in what is now northern Sudan and southern Egypt. The Kingdom of Kush interacted with the Egyptian civilization; the Egyptians traded grains and slaves in exchange for gold, salt, and cotton from the Kingdom of Kush.²¹

In Ethiopia, Yikunno Amlak, an Ethiopian ruler in 1270 BC, established a formal government with a military. The Ethiopian Kingdom identified itself as an extension of Solomon's Kingdom, claiming that its rulers were direct descendants of King Solomon.²² This is the earliest recorded event of the entry of nonindigenous African religion into East Africa. Amlak's kingdom observed Judaic practices, giving rise to modern-day Orthodox Christianity in modern-day Ethiopia.

By the seventh century, Arabs reached the interior of sub-Saharan Africa, bringing trade and the religion of Islam with them. Arab traders established trading posts along the east coast of Africa in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Tanzania.²³ They also established settlements along the Kenya and Tanzania coastline and intermarried with the local women. Trade between the locals and the Arabs gave rise to the Swahili language. At the same time, as the indigenous populations intermarried with Arabs, a new culture developed. The local traders exchanged ivory, rhinoceros horns, and leopard skins, metal crafts, beads, and slaves for cloth, silk, and glass.²⁴

During this same period, Arabs invaded Egypt; they spread their culture throughout the region, including sections of northern Sudan. Arabization and Islamization continued to spread southward by land and along the coastline. Arab traders and travelers, along with African clerics, continued to spread Islam and eventually established the Darfur Sultanate in 1596 in western Sudan.

The Darfur Sultanate declared Islam the state religion. In time this Sultanate gained prominence because it developed a formal leadership structure. The Sultanate established trade ties with Egypt, and it also had an administrative structure and a penal code. This made the Darfur Sultanate stand out from other traditional structures in this region, which were not as formalized.²⁵

Arrival of Europeans and Decline of Slave Trade

The most significant event in the pre-colonial era was the emergence of slave trade in 1444. The sudden demand for slave labor largely came from colonial plantations operating in the “new world” of Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America. Portuguese slave ships exchanged African slaves for European goods, sugar, and cotton.²⁶ The trade routes between Africa, Europe, and the Americas were lucrative. Slaves from the east coast of Africa were first sent to European slaving ports in London, Liverpool, and Bristol; and then moved on to labor-hungry plantations in the Americas.²⁷


The earliest Europeans to arrive in this region were Portuguese merchants. Vasco Da Gama arrived on the Kenyan Coast in 1498.²⁸ The Portuguese began to trade with the local communities; by 1600 they had established a slave market in Mombasa, Kenya.²⁹ Portuguese traders traded up and down the East African coastline, extending their reach southward as far as Mozambique.

European explorers, however, were not limited to the East African coast. Two British Royal Geographical Society explorers -- Richard Burton and John Hanning Speke -- arrived in Zanzibar (Tanzania) in 1852 with the goal of venturing into the region's untamed interior; they eventually reached Uganda in 1862.³⁰ Speke and Burton are credited with the discovery of Lake Tanganyika in Tanzania, and Lake Victoria. The latter, at the time of its discovery, was recorded as the source of the Nile River.³¹

Christian missionaries, much like their explorer counterparts, were also interested in tracing the Nile River to its source. David Livingstone for example, a missionary based in southern Africa, travelled into East Africa and visited Tanzania in 1877.³² Missionaries working in this region, such as Livingstone, endured great hardship due to East Africa's dense forests, menacing wildlife, and diseases such as malaria. Language was another obstacle, but when missionaries learned the local dialects, they established schools in the villages. This marked the beginning of formal education in this region. As the number of new converts increased, the local missions began to send them out as lay leaders to work as teachers and to proselytize to communities in the interior.

The activities of missionaries facilitated the migration of communities from the interior to other parts of the region as far north as Sudan. Traditional rulers began to learn English and tribal chiefs began to use interpreters to interact with missionaries and traders, thereby expanding their influence over the territory. Missionaries also hastened the opening up of the region; this empowered smaller, traditional authorities, and reduced the size and influence of larger ones.

David Livingstone recognized the immorality of slavery and was convinced that the only way to stop it was to open up Africa's interior to European traders. Livingstone also knew that more formal trade routes would also expand the spread of Christianity. With his effort to make Africa's interior more accessible to European traders directly, he thus became the first missionary-explorer in Africa.³³



Publicity about the cruelty of slave trade caused many Europeans to reconsider the practice. By the late 1800s, the British government banned the slave trade altogether.

HMS Brisk a British Ship captures a slave ship Emanuela in 1854 (Source: Wikipedia)

With the decline of slave trade came the demand for other goods. The Industrial Revolution in the West also forced European countries to look at Africa's wealth and trade potential.

Colonization

The Berlin Conference

The "interest" and competition among the European powers to occupy Africa to meet the demands of the Industrial Age is commonly referred to as the "Scramble for Africa". The "Scramble for Africa" paved the way for dialogue on various issues arising out of the exploration of Africa.

The Berlin Act of 1885: The participating powers resolved to protect the freedom of religion in all colonial territories, to suppress slavery, and to preserve native tribes and "provide for their material well-being."

To facilitate an organized and conflict-free exploration of Africa, German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck convened a conference in Berlin in 1884. The two-year discussion, known as the Berlin Conference, was attended by the European powers: France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. The Berlin Conference resolved to end the slave trade. Berlin conferees also agreed to partition Africa on behalf of the countries they represented, drawing boundaries on a map and designating each new territory a colony.³⁴

Following the Berlin Conference, these powers colonized the following countries:


- France: Djibouti
- Germany: Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania (Under the terms of Germany's surrender at the end of World War I, these territories were transferred to Belgium, France, and Britain.)
- Great Britain: Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan
- Italy: Somalia and Eritrea
- Ethiopia was the only country in this region to remain independent after violently resisting colonization by the Italians.

It is noteworthy that this region resisted European occupation. Ethiopia's resistance to Italy in 1890 is a prime example. In Kenya, a resistance movement in the late 1940s tried to throw off years of British colonial rule. Kenya's so-called *Man Man* movement was eventually successful: Britain negotiated a truce; in 1962, Kenya was granted self-rule.

Colonial Governance Structures:

The newly formed states began to develop separately from each other in terms of governance. Generally, the colonial governance structures in Africa were based on one of two systems - direct rule or indirect rule.

The British, who colonized Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, administered these countries through so-called "indirect rule." In indirect rule, the colonial government took the role of advisor, and sometimes supervisor, of local indigenous authorities, such as the chieftaincy. Although the British government left intact indigenous forms of governance, including the method of appointing the local chief, they interfered in the affairs of the local communities where and when it was advantageous for Britain. Additionally, although the local authority collected taxes from its subjects, a percentage was retained by the British government.



The Colonies of Africa (Source: Michigan State University)

Germany also applied an "indirect rule" approach in Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania. Like Britain, the German colonial government left intact local forms of governance, though colonial administrators interfered when it suited them.

France, which only colonized Djibouti, applied "direct rule," also known as "assimilation." This meant that the colonial government ruled through traditional African authorities who acted on the French government's behalf. This allowed the colonial government to create a society similar to that in France, including its language and culture³⁵.

Impact of Colonization on Ethnic Groups, Languages:

The partitioning of Africa did not take ethnic groups into consideration. As a result today, many members of the same ethnic group were -- and continue to be -- separated by national borders.

For example, at the Berlin Conference, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania became part of the German East Africa protectorate. However, after the Government of Belgium assumed responsibility for the Belgian Congo (now DRC), both Rwanda and Burundi became part of the Belgian administrative

district. In 1949, Belgium officially drew a formal boundary between Rwanda and Burundi, essentially splitting up the three main ethnic groups – Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa.³⁶

Another example is the Somali ethnic group, which resides across three current-day countries – Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. The Somali are divided by national borders but continue to share a common language and culture.

This region is home to over 500 indigenous languages and dialects.³⁷ Indigenous languages are used in elementary school and religious settings. Each country in this region is unique, as not all countries have retained the colonial official language as the national official language. Tanzania and Somalia have opted for Somali and Swahili, while Sudan retained Arabic. Generally speaking, English and Swahili are also used for commerce in this region, such as by Kenyan and Tanzanian traders.

The following languages are spoken in this region:

French: Burundi, Djibouti

English: Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan

Arabic: Sudan

Somali: Somalia

Ethiopia: Amharic

Tanzania: Swahili

Impact of Colonization on Infrastructure:

The impact of the colonization can also be seen in the regional infrastructure. The need to transport cash crops such as tea and coffee to the West led to the development of roads, bridges, and rail networks that connected the interior with the Indian Ocean coast. The transportation routes, in turn, were soon dotted with towns and urban centers.

Britain constructed the Ugandan Railway, which was sometimes referred to as the “Lunatic Line” because the builders of the railway encountered many hardships during its construction, including man-eating lions. The 625 mi (1,000 km) single-track Ugandan Railway began in Mombasa (Kenya) and ended in Kampala (Uganda). Of note, the railroad connected Uganda, a land-locked country, with the port of Mombasa in Kenya.³⁸

East Africa's transportation infrastructure was limited to areas of production - the railway served sugar cane, tea, and coffee production areas, as this region is mostly dependent on agriculture. Maintenance and expansion of this network after independence was minimal at best, and much of the region remained remote until new infrastructure projects were initiated in the twenty-first century. Today, most of this region's road and rail networks have been upgraded and connected to a broader regional network designed to spur development and trade. In addition to transportation, a public service system has been established.

Additionally, primary schools and medical dispensaries -- built mostly by missionaries -- became the foundation for hospital and school networks that service the region today.

Post Colonization


In the mid-1940s, soon after the end of World War II, resistance movements began to pressure colonial governments across the continent to grant self-rule.³⁹ In response, colonial authorities began to transition their colonies toward independence in the late 1950s. By 1960, the first of the territories had been granted self-rule – Sudan (1956), Somalia (1960), Rwanda (1961), Uganda (1962), Burundi (1962), Kenya (1963), and Djibouti (1977). Djibouti's independence marked the end of the era of European colonization. The remaining countries in this region gained independence much later: Eritrea (1993) and South Sudan (2011). Both Eritrea and South Sudan were granted independence following years of violent struggle. Eritrea fought against Ethiopian domination, while South Sudan fought to separate from northern Sudan.

Throughout East Africa, outside influences—notably trade and interaction with Europeans—have historically shaped religion, language, and other aspects of regional culture. These past experiences, coupled with ongoing social and political changes, continue to define regional history, politics, and economy.

Marines deploying to this region should remain aware that instability in one country almost immediately impacts the entire region. The genocide in Rwanda is one such event that has had a widespread and lasting impact on the region today.

A lack of strong governing structures, ethnic disagreements, and competition over economic resources caused widespread civil wars within the newly independent countries. Many of these wars lasted for decades. There have been recurring conflicts in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and South Sudan. These conflicts have been responsible for millions of civilian deaths and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

There has also been progress, however. Citizens in most East African countries are able to participate in free and fair election processes. Regardless, this region continues to be fragile: many political and security issues continue to threaten East Africa's peace and stability. Many of the issues that impede progress in this region will be discussed in greater detail later in this module.



People and Society

Why People and Society Matter to You as a Marine


Missions across the range of military operations require Marines to understand, and work with, foreign populations. Knowing the people in the region, including their ethnicities, languages, and religions, as well as the way they live in social entities, enables Marines to create a mental picture of the human dimension of the region.

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Demographics

In 2014, East Africa had an estimated population of approximately 322 million people across 11 countries.⁴⁰ Most people in this region live in rural areas; however, rapid population growth will likely increase urbanization.

East Africa is a major contributor to the rapid population growth in Africa. The UN predicts that Africa's global population will increase to 2.2 billion (24 percent of the world's total population) by 2050. Uganda's population is growing at a rate of 3.2 percent, while the population of South Sudan is growing at 4 percent per year.⁴¹ Currently, Ethiopia is the region's most populated country, with approximately 99 million people⁴², as depicted in the chart below.



Population Statistics by Country (Source: CIA World Factbook)

Migration is a notable feature affecting the demographics of this region. Populations migrate to and from countries for seasonal work. Other migrants are people fleeing conflicts, drought, or other instability.

There are many migration routes in this region. Major routes take migrants through the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East; though North Africa to Europe; and through Kenya and Tanzania to South Africa.



Migrants from Africa to Europe (Source: IRIN)

By far, the most dangerous migration route is by boat though the Gulf of Aden. In 2009, for example, among the estimated 50,000 people who crossed the Gulf from Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia to Yemen; it is presumed that as many as 600 migrants drowned.⁴³

In 2015, continued instability in Somalia and South Sudan -- coupled with depressed economic conditions in other East African countries -- caused the region's estimated number of migrants to reach 92,466.⁴⁴ Additionally, heightened instability in Yemen resulted in a reverse shift in the migration patterns from this region: refugees and migrant workers in Yemen are now retracing their arduous route across the Gulf of Aden back into East Africa.

Conflict and instability elsewhere in this region have created a surge in refugees. For example, Kenya has been host to almost a million refugees in the last ten years. These refugees are mainly from South

Sudan and Somalia. The current number of refugees in camps within Kenya's borders stands at 552,271 (2016).⁴⁵ Sudan is host to approximately 356,000 refugees from South Sudan and Egypt; Tanzania is host to 150,000 refugees, mainly from Burundi.⁴⁶

Religion

John Mbiti, famed African author and theologian, succinctly summed up spiritual life in Africa: "Africans are notoriously religious."⁴⁷ Religion plays a significant role in all aspects of life in East Africa. It shapes values and identity. The major religions practiced in the region are Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and animism (nature worship), sometimes called "traditional beliefs." Islam has a majority following in Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti, and Tanzania. Christianity is also practiced extensively in this region.

Islam

Commerce and conquest helped to spread Islam throughout East Africa. Countries in the Horn of Africa adjacent to the Gulf of Aden (Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia) have larger Muslim populations due to greater historical interaction with Arabs and closer geographic proximity to the Arab world. Other countries in the lower part of the region, particularly Kenya and Tanzania, have predominant Muslim populations along the coastline, as well along the border with predominant Muslim countries.



Mosques are common religious and community sites in this region (Source: Wikipedia)

The North East Province in Kenya has a large Muslim population due to its proximity to Somalia, which has a majority Muslim population. Additionally, the Island of Zanzibar (which is part of Tanzania) is predominantly Muslim because of its historical trade ties with Arabs. Communities along Kenya's coastline are also predominantly Muslim. However, communities in the interior parts of this region are predominantly Christian or animist. In Rwanda for example, the Muslim population is only 1.8 percent of the population (which in total is 12.6 million).⁴⁸

Islam teaches that there is one God, Allah, and the Prophet Mohammed, his messenger. The Qur'an is the central book of Islam, and provides spiritual and practical guidelines for leading an Islamic way of life—*Sharia* or Islamic law. Friday is the Muslim holy day when *Jumu'ah* prayers take place. Male Muslims pray in congregation in Mosques or *Masjids*.

Muslims in East Africa adhere to the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad and practice it within the five Pillars of Islam:

1. Profession of one's faith (*shahada*) [shah-hah-duh].
2. Prayer (*salat*) five times a day.
3. Giving alms (*zakat*). *Zakat* requires giving 2.5% of a person's money each year, and a varying percentage for other assets held for the entire year.
4. A pilgrimage to Mecca (*Hajj*).
5. Fasting during *Ramadan* (*sawm*).

A majority of Muslims in this region are Sunni, whose practice is referred to as Sufism. Sufism is practiced under three Sufi orders (*tariqah*): *Qadriyya*, *Muridiyya*, or *Tijaniyya*. *Qadriyya* is the most widely spread, and is dominant in this region.⁴⁹ Sufism promotes inclusiveness and is considered moderate, unlike Wahhabism and Salafism, the other two major factions of Islam. Wahhabi doctrines were adopted by the early leaders of Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi, and the closely related Salafists, demand literal and strict interpretation of the Qu'ran and the *Hadith*, the traditional sayings of the Prophet Mohammad.

TACTICAL TIP: When deployed to this region during the month of Ramadan, be mindful of fasting: do not eat, drink, or smoke in public; and do not offer a Muslim food during this time. Note that you may need to adjust your program to accommodate a flexible working schedule.

East Africa faces a growing threat of Islamist extremists. The 1998 twin bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were planned and organized by an al-Qaeda cell in Sudan which hosted Osama Bin Laden. Additionally, the region faces a new challenge as a result of increased radicalization of its youth. Al-Shabaab, the Islamic terror group affiliated with al-Qaeda, has actively recruited young men and women who attend training camps in Somalia. These young people have been used to launch terror attacks in Kenya and Uganda.

Recommended Reading:

For more on Jihadism, see:


Michael A. Gomez, "Pragmatism in the Age of Jihad: The Precolonial State of Bundu," African Studies Series, No. 75 Cambridge University Press (1992).

Christianity

Christians in East Africa are a majority. Except for Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti, all other countries in this region have a 50 percent or higher Christian population. The three most common

Christian denominations in this region are Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism. Ethiopia and Eritrea are roughly 50 percent Christian, mostly Orthodox. Much of the country's literature and art has

Judeo-Christian roots. Orthodox Jews in Ethiopia trace their roots to *Beta Israel*, a Jewish community in Ethiopia whose members are said to be descended from King Solomon. Neighbors of the *Beta Israel* community call them the *Falashas* (the "alien ones" or "invaders"). *Falashas* were never allowed to own land; most of these people were forced to be tenant farmers. The constant persecution of Ethiopian *Falashas* prompted Israel to conduct *Operation Solomon*, which resettled the entire *Falasha* tribe of about 14,500 people to Israel in 1991.⁵⁰



Source: Pew Research, Religious and Public Life Project

The religious practices of the *Falasha* largely influenced the modern Orthodox Church in Ethiopia and Eritrea today. Like Judaism, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church places heavier emphasis on Old Testament teachings than Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. Ethiopian Christians require male circumcision and follow dietary rules similar to Jewish dietary laws. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has many fasting days where people do not eat meat of any kind. You will find many people observing fast days throughout the country.

Throughout the region, the evangelical movement -- largely an offshoot of Protestantism -- is expanding. The evangelical movement is responsible for much of the religious conversion and growth of Christianity in this region today. Much like the Christian missionaries who first arrived in this region in the early 1800s, the evangelical movement is expanding its reach using social programs, and playing a role in policymaking at the national level in the areas of education and health.

Unlike many Western nations, where there is a clear demarcation between church and State, there is no such line in many of the countries in this region. While the political landscape in Africa mandates the inclusion of village elders and chiefs as part of the political process and in order to achieve political success, it has lately become equally important for political leaders to seek support from the Christian clergy. The church can—and does—very easily wield influence over modern-day society. For example, the National Council of Churches of Kenya is (NCCCK) is consulted on many social issues, including the drafting of legislation. In South Sudan, the church has played a role in the peace process, acting as a mediator between warring factions.

Many Christians in this region practice a fusion of Christianity and other beliefs. This hybrid form of Christianity includes elements of “traditional” worship styles and rituals, or animism. Because superstitious beliefs permeate almost all organized religions in East Africa, it is common to find traditional rituals applied at events such as births, weddings, and funerals, alongside rites designated by formal Christian denominations.

Although Catholicism is widely practiced in East Africa, individual actions are dictated by a set of beliefs from both Catholicism and traditional beliefs. For example, it is common to see an individual wearing a rosary around his neck as well as a traditional charm band on another part of his body. Communities today rely on their religious experiences to guide their daily lives, from family decision-making to influencing decisions at a community-level.

Animism

Animism practices or traditional beliefs are widely practiced in East Africa. Animists believe that the universe contains three worlds: the past, present, and future. These are parallel worlds that cross each other. Animists – or “traditional believers” – tend to seek harmony between these worlds. There are no animist holy texts or official places of worship. Instead, the rituals are considered part of their ethnic identity. Each ethnic group has its own animist creation story, creator-

African traditional beliefs tend to share common themes:

- Universal forces created the earth and remain present
- Spirits fill the natural world and mediate between the past and future
- These spirits determine the course of present life, which often leads to a fatalistic view of events

god, spirits, and rituals. Beliefs in witchcraft, sorcery, and magic are evident in this region, though specific rituals and beliefs vary across tribes.

Animism is a communitarian concept, meaning that the community suffers or benefits from the consequences of each person's individual actions. The ancestors are also believed to be participants in the present world and can pass on good or evil to the community. Elements of animistic rituals have influenced Islam and Christianity in this region. Although organized religion (Islam and Christianity) has been accepted by many rural Africans, traditional spiritual beliefs persist in these areas.

“Because traditional religions permeate all the departments of life, there is no formal distinction between the sacred and the secular, between religious and non-religious, between the spiritual and the material areas of life...Where the individual is, there is his religion, for he is a religious being. It is this that makes Africans so religious: religion is in their whole system of being...What people do is motivated by what they believe, and what they believe springs from what they do and experience. So then, belief and action in African traditional society cannot be separated: they belong to a single whole.”⁵¹

Traditional (animist) concepts are used to give meaning to significant events. For example, the spread of the HIV/AIDs virus in this region (especially in the 80s and 90s) was attributed to an evil spirit; this hindered prevention and treatment efforts. Reports from the region revealed a widespread belief that the virus was not real. People who were infected did not seek medical attention, but instead went to witch doctors for remedy. Additionally, because illness and disease are considered attacks on the community, individuals with HIV/AIDS were ostracized in order for the community "to avoid the wrath of the gods." This belief was more common in rural villages, which are still tied strongly to traditional beliefs. These superstitious beliefs hampered diagnosis and prevention efforts, and eventually led to a campaign to sensitize the population on the factual specifics of HIV/AIDS.

Ethnic Groups

East Africa has hundreds of ethnic groups that live in the same geographical area and share similar cultures, language structures, and identities. Despite those similarities, ethnicity remains a major driver in regional conflicts. The persistence of ethnic tensions is a concern for many international peace and security organizations, especially because this region has had two recorded genocides within the last 25 years.

The peoples of this region primarily belong to one of three main ethnic families: the Bantu, the Cushite, or the Nilote. Hundreds of smaller ethnic groups belong to the Bantu family. They all speak one of the Bantu languages⁵² and share common traditions and beliefs. The Bantu are descended from a common ancestor; their unique identifying physical features (facial structure, height, skin color, hair texture) distinguish them from other neighboring groups. There are over 500 Bantu languages and dialects encompassing East, Central, and Southern Africa. Tribe, clan, and family are important units in Bantu society.⁵³


The Cushite ethnic grouping is comprised of Somalis of Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. They have similar physical features and language structure.⁵⁴ The Cushite speak an Afro-Asiatic language (one spoken in North Africa, the Middle East, or western Asia).⁵⁵ The Cushite were originally from the Middle East. From about 15,000 to 10,000 BC they migrated to Africa through the Sinai Peninsula to

the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia), and eventually moved into Sudan and Kenya.⁵⁶ The largest Cushitic tribes are the Oromo of Ethiopia (35 million) and the Somali (18 million).⁵⁷

The final major ethnic group in this region is the Nilote. This group is found around the Nile River, in Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Kenya. The Nilote share similar physical features and economic lifestyles; they mostly practice agriculture and pastoralism.⁵⁸ The largest Nilotic groups are the Luo, in Kenya; the Acholi, in Uganda; the Nubians in Sudan; and the Dinka and Nuer, in South Sudan. Collectively, they number approximately seven million people.⁵⁹

Historically, some ethnic groups straddle borders. For example, the Somali people live in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Since the post-independence era began in about 1960, ethnic violence has led to conflict, both across ethnicities and across borders. One such example resulted when the Belgian colonial administration created a Tutsi ruling class, who dominated even after independence in 1962, leading to the 1994 genocide that left over one million Tutsi dead in Rwanda and Burundi.⁶⁰ Similarly, the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region pitted nomadic Arab tribes against the African farming tribes (the *Fur*, *Masalit* and *Zaghawa*).⁶¹ The genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan has left 300,000 dead so far and displaced millions more.⁶²

In Kenya, ethnic tensions are a product of economic marginalization as well as politics. Leaders capitalize on ethnic issues to gain political leverage. After the 2007 general elections, violence erupted between supporters of the two main political parties: the Party of National Unity (PNU) and Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The PNU presidential candidate was from the largest tribe, the Kikuyu; the ODM presidential candidate was from the Luo tribe. The electoral commission announced the results, declaring the PNU candidate as president. The announcement triggered the systematic cleansing of the Kikuyu ethnic group from the Rift Valley province, whose inhabitants had voted for ODM. At the same time, revenge killings were launched against members of the Luo community, who were seen as supporters of the ODM.



Source: CIA World Factbook

Languages

A Marine deployed to East Africa who is unfamiliar with the predominant local languages (French, Swahili, Arabic, or Amharic) is recommended to use an interpreter while interacting with the indigenous people. Nelson Mandela's insight on the power of language in communication sums the matter best: "If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his heart."⁶³

Language Groups in Africa (based on similarity of linguistic structure):

- **Afro-Asiatic:** Also known as the Hamito-Semitic language family. It includes Berber, Chadic, Cushitic, Ancient Egyptian, Omotic, and Semetic spoken in northern Africa.
- **Nilo-Saharan:** These are languages spoken in North Africa and the Sahel in Sudan, Libya, Egypt, and Algeria. They include Old Nubian and Arabic.
- **Niger-Congo A:** These are spoken in West Africa. Examples include Yoruba, Igbo, and Fula.
- **Niger-Congo B:** These are spoken by the Bantu group, which originated from Cameroon and migrated across East, Central, and Southern Africa. Examples are Shona and Zulu, but the most common is Swahili.
- **Khoisan:** These are spoken by the Khoi Khoi in Southern Africa and the San (Bushmen) of the Kalahari in Namibia. It is commonly identified by its "click" sound.
- **Austronesian:** These are spoken in the island nations of Mauritius and Madagascar. One example is Malagay.



Language groups in Africa by country (Source: Nations Online Project)

The ethnic diversity of most East African nations has resulted in several languages being spoken within each country. For example, in Tanzania there are over 200 different dialects spoken; however, almost all Tanzanians speak Swahili.

Despite the ethnic diversity in the region, people live in close proximity to other ethnic groups that belong to the same "people group" (Bantu, Nilote or Cushite).

Almost all languages spoken in this region are classified under one of those three people groups. As a result, people in this region can communicate quite easily with each other thanks to many language similarities. For example, the Kikuyu of Kenya can easily communicate with their Kamba, Embu, and Meru neighbors because they all come from the Bantu people group.

In addition to their indigenous language, a majority of East Africans speak two or more other languages: an "official language" which reflects the region's history of European colonization (French,

Arabic, or English); a “national language” (Swahili, Kirundi, and Kinyarwanda); and a language spoken within their ethnic group, like Kikuyu in Kenya, Dinka in South Sudan, and Baganda in Uganda.

English is taught in almost all schools across the region. The majority of educated, urban people are fluent in English, including military officers and noncommissioned officers, especially those who have trained in the United States.

Family Structure

The concept of family in East Africa is different from that of the West. The extended family is an important unit in all countries in this region. Polygamy is widely practiced which expands the reach of the “immediate family.” In a polygamous home, labor is split between the wives and children, especially in rural areas where the household economy is heavily reliant on agriculture. In urban areas, the extended family shares a home; the men are the main income earners while wives manage the home.



Nuclear Family Common in Urban Areas (Source: USAID)

In the social structure, authority is based on kinship, and the head of the family is usually the eldest male member. The tribe, clan, and family are taken into consideration in decision-making. There are advantages to the large familial homestead. For instance, in times of war, the larger homesteads can better protect themselves from their enemies. Larger homesteads also have a larger workforce, important because most of the countries rely on agriculture, fishing, and rearing livestock for their livelihoods. Nomadic tribes rely on their family members to graze and water their livestock.

TACTICAL TIP: Family is very important. However, the extended family, in parts of this region, has been heavily impacted by war and poverty. In many cases, one or more of your counterparts may have lost a close family member through war, famine, or disease. Use your judgment when making inquiries about relations. Additionally, note that the concept of “brother/sister” may not refer to a blood relative.

The division of labor is distinct; women are responsible for domestic chores including basic food supply for the family. In urban areas, most families are monogamous, but the extended family is consulted on important occasions such as a birth, marriage, and death. Members of the extended family residing in urban areas are relied upon for financial assistance by family members residing in rural areas.

It is common for members of the extended family in rural areas to send their children to the city to reside with more affluent members of the extended family. Additionally, the modern family structure has been affected by war, the high rate of migration, and displacement. This is most evident in Somalia, South Sudan, and in the Darfur region of Sudan. Other factors have impacted the family unit structure, including disease: mainly HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, typhoid, and malaria. These effects, however, have not diminished the value of the family unit in society.

Income Distribution

Agriculture plays a crucial role in the economy of East Africa. Much of the rural population living in East Africa engages in subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda all export coffee, tea, flowers, sugar, and tobacco. Sudan and South Sudan are oil producers; Somalia and Djibouti export livestock and livestock products. This region is also a popular tourist destination because of its diverse wildlife.


Mismanagement and corruption have greatly impacted the region's ability to harness its potential. In government, low pay for civil servants, government bureaucracy, lenient record-keeping, and a lack of transparency all abet corrupt behavior. As a result, citizens are forced to pay bribes to government employees in order to obtain public services. For example, although there is a growing class of micro-level entrepreneurs who conduct their businesses in the informal sector, the price of staying in business is high due to inflated licensing costs that factor in bribes for public servants. This in turn deprives the population of viable and continuous income streams.

Additionally, the gap between the rich and the poor, as well as between urban and rural populations, is widening. Available data paints a stark picture: a majority of rural East African families live on less than a dollar a day. Generally speaking, urban families bring in more income, yet very often remit a share of this money to their families in the countryside.⁶⁴

Although economies are diversifying to include information and communication technology (ICT), streamlining the public sector and sealing loopholes that enable corruption has not yet rendered a benefit to the citizenry. For example, although ICT has led to innovation and advancements in research, and more young people can access the training they need to enter formal employment, opportunities for young people are few.⁶⁵ Youth unemployment in this region is high and poses a stability risk. Although unemployment and underemployment in this region are difficult to measure, the so-called "youth bubble" is evident. Both skilled and unskilled youth lack opportunities and resources to sustain livelihoods, and many are forced to work in the informal sector.⁶⁶ Thousands of young people remain unproductive, and are thus susceptible to mobilization and recruitment efforts by armed groups such as the White Army in South Sudan and terror groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia.



Youth unemployment is a threat to stability in Africa
(Photo by Tommy Trenchard; Source: IRIN)



Youth unemployment rate in 2014 (Eastern Africa) (Source: World Bank)

Education

Traditionally, education in Africa has been an informal process lasting throughout a person's lifetime. Participation in work, community celebrations, religious traditions, and rites of passage guide a person's educational development.

Formal education was introduced in the pre-colonial era by missionaries; by the 1950s, most missions had established schools. However, only limited numbers of people in this region advance past primary school.

Over the decades, the literacy rate in East Africa has changed dramatically, particularly in countries that have experienced periods of conflict. For example, in 2012, Ethiopia reported 63 percent of its people age 15 and above were literate; however, there is no clear data for Somalia and South Sudan due to instability in both countries.⁶⁷ In the most stable economies -- such as Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, and Tanzania -- the quality of education has improved and measures at 80 percent literacy.⁶⁸ Despite the data, the quality of education is still far from perfect, especially in the area of information technology.



USAID is working to boost access to education in West Africa (Source: USAID)

Technical and vocational schools offer a few specializations, but annual enrollment in these schools is low. Through USAID, the U.S. has boosted primary school education in the region, increasing both access to, and the quality of, education.⁶⁹

In most East African countries, the quality of a person's education reflects their socioeconomic background. Wealthy parents send their children to private schools, while poor children must attend

underfunded public schools, many of which have poorly-trained teachers. The student-instructor ratio is deficient which is problematic because it impacts enrollment rates for the youth. The shortfall is also a challenge to policy makers who have to address the youth bubble and employment options for a young workforce. Although there are various programs in place to enhance youth employability, many do not offer skills training that meets market-relevant needs.

Other factors that interfere with education include natural disasters, civil conflict, famine, and drought. In Somalia and South Sudan in particular, a general lack of security has forced the closure of many schools.

Healthcare

East Africa is considered a high-risk area for vector-borne diseases such as malaria, and waterborne diseases like typhoid, cholera, and hepatitis A.⁷⁰ By global standards, medical capabilities in this region are below average. This was evident during the onset and consequent management of the human immunodeficiency virus which in its most advanced stage is known as acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) in the in the 80s and 90s. However, the international community has worked with regional governments to strengthen the healthcare sector and reduced the HIV/AIDs infection cases as well as advanced treatment options to thousands of patients in rural areas. Today, the spread of HIV/AIDS is relatively low, having been reduced from 14 percent to 5 percent in Kenya alone over the last ten years.⁷¹ This can be attributed to the millions spent by the international community in the hardest hit countries in this region – Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania -- to boost the health infrastructure. However, access to maternal care for women and infants, as well as the diagnosis and treatment of malaria and tuberculosis, still pose the greatest risk to the population.


Malaria is most common during the rainy season as the mosquitoes breed in damp and swampy environments. Malaria poses a risk to all, but especially to pregnant women and the elderly. To date, much of USAID's annual budget has been devoted to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS and malaria.⁷² The other high-casualty disease in this region is tuberculosis (TB), which is most prevalent among HIV/AIDS patients. TB is a fatal disease because it has a long incubation period. Because the TB virus is airborne, it also infects non-HIV/AIDs patients; this means that TB cases could be twice the number of HIV/AIDS cases, if left unchecked.⁷³

TACTICAL TIP: A vector-borne disease is a disease transmitted by pathogens and parasites. They are common in sub-tropical regions and in areas without access to safe drinking water. The most common diseases in this region are malaria, typhoid, and hepatitis. When deployed to this region, Marines should take prophylactic drugs, use mosquito nets, and drink treated water.



USAID works to boost primary healthcare at the community level (Source: USAID)

Some of the major challenges facing the health sector include inadequate access to healthcare and emergency facilities, lack of essential medicines, and a general inability of local governments to respond to outbreaks. The availability of trained professionals and medical supplies varies from country to country. Poverty, conflict, and an underdeveloped infrastructure are responsible for limiting the availability of medical care in the region. South Sudan and Somalia, for example, are worse off than other countries in this region. Additionally, although there has been significant improvement in tackling infant mortality, more still needs to be done, especially because of the large numbers of refugees and displaced persons in this region who lack adequate healthcare.



Infant mortality rates in the region remain relatively high. However, all countries in East Africa have experienced a decline in recent years. The decline is attributed to the efforts by governments and international partners to increase access region-wide to healthcare and to counter common ailments – malaria, typhoid and other HIV/AIDS related infections.

Infant mortality in Eastern Africa Source: The World Bank

Government and Politics

Why Government and Politics Matter to You as a Marine

Most people live in states governed by formal and informal institutions. Marines need to know how power and authority are distributed in the state by studying the formal and informal structures of governments in the region. In addition, Marines need to understand how people, groups, and institutions exercise power and authority, in other words, what comprises politics in the states.

Political Systems

Since most East African countries began to gain their independence in the 1960s, ethnic groups, religions, and traditional leaders have influenced the evolution of national political and legal systems.

Many East African countries have functional national and local governments. The national (or central) governments have an executive branch, a legislature and a judiciary. Although some of these countries have taken steps to decentralize their national governments in order to better serve rural populations, they continue to rely on informal leadership structures (traditional elders and chiefs, and non-governmental organizations, for example) to deliver services, especially in the health sector.

Subordinate to the national (or central) government, there are government bodies that are typically structured in three tiers; these three levels of governance are intended to give citizens a greater degree of self-rule: in the top tier, provincial governments (similar to state governments in the U.S.); in the middle, county-like district governments; and, at the bottom, town or village councils.



USAID official consults a Chief. Local leaders engage in development activities at the village level (Source: USAID)

Prior to the mid-twentieth century, a traditional chief exercised political leadership at the provincial, district, and village level. Today, central and local governments perform these functions, effectively removing the political and economic powers of most chiefs. However, in remote areas of many East African countries (particularly those neglected by central governments), chiefs wield significant power and work with the central government, elected leaders, and civil society in crisis management and conflict resolution.

East Africa's formal political systems (central government) remain fragile due primarily to their violent histories. Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, South Sudan, and Somalia, for example have all experienced politically-instigated crises. At the same time, most countries in this region (Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, and Burundi) have experienced successful *coups d'état*. There were 15 successful military *coups d'état* in this region between 1960 and 2014.⁷⁴

Notwithstanding *coups*, authoritarian regimes have solidified their grip on power. One example is President Yoweri Museveni, who took over Uganda's national government in a military *coup* in 1987. Although he was hailed as a reformer and a homegrown democrat in the first seven years of his presidency, President Museveni has remained at the helm of government for over twenty-five years. The Ugandan President was the first in this region to amend the constitution to allow himself to run for another term in office. This has now become the new trend. Rwanda amended its constitution in 2015 to allow Paul Kagame to run for another term.⁷⁵ President Kagame has been in power since 2000, and the constitutional amendment will allow him to remain in power until 2034.⁷⁶



President Ronald Reagan meets President Museveni in 1987, soon after he became Uganda's President (Source: Wikipedia)

Similarly, on May 5, 2015, Burundi's Constitutional court gave President Pierre Nkurunziza -- who has been in power since 2005 -- the right to run for a third term. Protests broke out when this decision was announced; soon after, on May 17, 2015, there was an attempted *coup d'état*. However, Nkurunziza was able to retain his hold on the presidency; the ensuing violence triggered an exodus of refugees into Rwanda and Tanzania.⁷⁷

Rwanda and Uganda have remained relatively stable amid this political maneuvering. However, Burundi has struggled to return to normalcy since early 2015. To date, it is unclear whether President Nkurunziza will hand over power at the end of his current term in 2020.

Corruption in the Public Sector

One of the major impediments to development in this region is corruption. Government services are not accessible to the people – especially those in the rural areas. It has become increasingly difficult to renew documents such as passports, car registrations, and land title deeds, among other documents, without a bribe. Bribes are labeled as “facilitation fees” and are openly requested by civil servants.

In Kenya, corruption has been labeled a national security threat because of its link to terrorism. Reports indicate that the Kenyan police have looked the other way while illegal immigrants – some of whom are linked to Al-Shabaab – cross the Kenya-Somali border and plan terror attacks against the population. Additionally, traffic police who often interact with the populace are conduits of

TACTICAL TIP: The term “corruption” does not have a direct translation in many African languages. This is because discretionary reciprocity and gift-giving are cultural concepts that are expected as a form of gratitude. In today's global environment, governments in this region classify this practice as graft, where such reciprocity is demanded for a service. In most countries, it is difficult to conduct business without a “facilitation fee” or a demonstration of “gratitude.”

this habit. They collect millions in bribes from motorists, especially mass transit vehicles. Motorists stopped for a traffic offense are often willing to pay a "lesser fine" (bribe) to a police officer because the "official fine" is usually much higher, and because a plaintiff can sometimes spend an entire day waiting in a court of law to have their traffic case considered by a judge. The cash paid to corrupt policemen for these "lesser fines" is later shared with corrupt court officials, including judges.⁷⁸

The public procurement system is also another way that taxpayer revenue is siphoned off by criminal cartels. Public officials reportedly ask for kickbacks from large contractors and demand bribes from anyone wishing to submit a bid. In Rwanda, the so-called "least corrupt" country in this region, gross financial mismanagement and embezzlement persist.

Although many governments in this region have expressed a willingness to fight graft, the most urgent issue in tackling corruption is the failure to prosecute corrupt officials. In Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, the institutions responsible for investigating these crimes are underperforming. The local judicial system is often complicit in a country's inability to prosecute corrupt officials: tactical delays imposed by dishonest judges and prosecutors in trying a case will often expose witnesses and whistle blowers to threats and intimidation. Additionally, a significant number of cases are dropped for lack of evidence.

Corruption Perception Index (2015): East Africa		
Country	Ranking (of 168)	Score (Out of 100)
Rwanda	44	54
Djibouti	99	34
Ethiopia	103	33
Tanzania	117	30
Kenya	139	25
Uganda	139	25
Burundi	150	21
Eritrea	154	18
South Sudan	163	15
Sudan	165	12
Somalia	167	8

Source: Transparency International

Nationalism

Nationalism in this context refers to the feeling of kinship and belonging based on shared values and beliefs. This usually translates to an identity.⁷⁹ Colonization fomented disaffection and resistance. Because people were prevented from organizing country-wide resistance, communities galvanized and mobilized ethnically. The result is that in this region, populations now identify first with their tribe and then with their nation. When nations gained independence in the 1960s, the national flag became a symbol of national pride. However, self-governance saw its share of challenges, and any sense of newfound national pride soon began to erode.

Recommended Reading:

To read more about Nationalism see: National versus Ethnic Identity in Africa: State, Group, and Individual Level Correlates of National Identification by Amanda Lea Robinson (University of California, Berkeley, 2009); Nationalism, Development and the Postcolonial State: The Legacies of the League of Nations by Antony Anghie
<http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/41/num3/Anghie447.pdf>

Religious, ethnic, and other socio-economic issues have caused rifts that have led to conflict. In Rwanda and Burundi, for example, ethnicity became the source of conflict that eventually led to genocide in 1994.⁸⁰

Nationalism in East Africa can also be seen in language and language policy. Although local languages such as Amharic, Somali, and Swahili are widely spoken (as are other local dialects).

English is predominantly used as an official language in most countries. French is also used as the official language in Djibouti and Burundi. Rwanda had French as its official language until the genocide in 1994, when it changed its language policy and made English the official language. Official languages reflect the region's history: Great Britain, France, and Belgium were the main actors in East Africa during the colonial period.

Language has been used to promote national cohesion in a region that is ethnically diverse with hundreds of linguistic groups. Language is the most unifying element, although it has also been a source of contention because, in many cases, some indigenous languages have been marginalized.

National pride is mostly observed in during national events such as

independence recognition days. However, sports such as boxing and long-distance running are popular and often elicit a sense of unity and national pride. This region is home to world-record-holders in long-distance running: runners from Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda are known for their prowess at many international running events, including the New York, Boston, and London Marathons.

The national flag in each of these countries is a symbol of unity and shared nationhood. However, poverty and lack of transparency have eroded public trust in governance and institutions of government, making national pride an ideal that has yet to be fully achieved.

Rule of Law

Most countries in this region are currently undergoing institutional reforms aimed at strengthening the judiciary.

Rwanda is a good regional example of progress and adherence to the rule of law, especially because the 1994 genocide revealed an absolute collapse of rule of law. Like other countries in this region that have undergone conflict,⁸¹ even before the 1994 genocide, Rwanda's judicial structures were dominated by unchecked executive power and a culture of impunity.



Ethiopia's Tirunesh Dibaba at the Bislett Games in Oslo (2008) (Source: Wikipedia)


After the Rwandan genocide, the entire national judiciary was left in ruins, incapable of delivering justice for victims. In response, the International Criminal Court (ICC) set up a separate International Criminal Court for Rwanda to prosecute perpetrators who bore the greatest responsibility for the genocide.⁸² In an effort to promote reconciliation and strengthen local governments, the government of Rwanda released approximately two million offenders awaiting trial in jail back into their communities to be tried in the *Gacaca*, or community courts.⁸³ *Gacaca* courts were run by lay magistrates because of the lack of trained judicial personnel capable of addressing the scale of the offenses.

Gacaca courts were traditional justice and reconciliation forums organized by the government of Rwanda to take on the backlog of cases in the formal justice system while fostering reconciliation at the grassroots level.

Other countries in this region emerging from conflict like Somalia, South Sudan, and northern Uganda, have faced the same challenges: an erosion of social capital and trust in the judicial system, and the lack of trained personnel to deliver justice. Because populations in conflict areas suffer injustices, it has become increasingly important to decentralize the judiciary in order to reach such populations. In Uganda for example, although mobile court systems have been set up as part of an access to justice program, there is still a vacuum when it comes to specific legal issues like gender violence. Rape and domestic violence are common, and in some places, gender violence units have been established within the auspices of the police force to investigate and prosecute such crimes.

In the Kenyan police and judiciary, reforms are underway to strengthen rule of law and the administration of justice. Because the judiciary and police have lost public trust due to corruption within the institutions, the government has put in place a vetting mechanism to weed out corrupt officers. Additionally, the police training curriculum has been enhanced to include courses on ethics and integrity.

The following table compares “rule of law indicators” in the region as compared to the United States. These indicators measure confidence in the judiciary and the police, compliance, enforcement of rules of society, and the likelihood of crime and violence. A higher indicator demonstrates better adherence to rule of law principles.



Source: World Bank

Assessment of rule of law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance)

Political Conflicts

This region has experienced several political conflicts. Somalia has had a long period of instability and the situation remains dire. Although Africa Union forces have been able to secure Mogadishu, much of Somalia is ungovernable due to the presence of Al-Shabaab, a terror group with links to al-Qaeda. Although neighboring countries have hosted refugees from Somalia and have also bolstered their own security infrastructure to counter threats posed by the terror group, Somalia's instability has greatly impacted the security of this region beyond its own borders.

In 2007, Kenya's elections turned violent after the Electoral Commission announced the winner. The ensuing violence quickly escalated into conflict that left approximately 1,200 people dead and displaced another 600.⁸⁴ The Kenyan violence ended after a negotiated agreement was put in place. The opposing parties settled for a coalition government that had a president, vice president, and executive prime minister. Additionally, the ICC, investigating the post-election violence, eventually indicted six Kenyans for committing crimes against humanity. Although most of these charges were subsequently dropped, two of the ICC cases are still pending.⁸⁵

South Sudan gained independence from Sudan in 2011, yet many unresolved issues between the various pre-independence political factions still remain. South Sudan's president, Salva Kiir, and the former vice president, Riek Machar, belong to two different political parties whose differences have persisted since South Sudan gained its independence.

In 2013, fighting broke out in South Sudan after the government of Salva Kiir accused Riek Machar of planning a *coup d'état*. Violence broke out in each of their political strongholds, leaving hundreds of people dead and thousands



Marines repatriate U.S. citizens from South Sudan in 2014 after political violence broke out. (Source: AFRICOM)

displaced. Since 2013, there have been various agreements and a ceasefire; however, the security situation remains fragile. The U.S. is a key supporter of mediation between the warring factions and remains engaged in this peace process, despite the fact that a Marine helicopter was hit by rebel forces during an evacuation mission in 2013.⁸⁶ The U.S. is also a key provider of humanitarian aid.

The most heinous violence in the region was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This infamous bloodbath was triggered by a political event, when the Presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi were killed when the Rwandan presidential jet was shot down on its way back from the Arusha Peace Summit in Tanzania.⁸⁷ Ethnic violence ensued in both Rwanda and Burundi. Although both countries have been able to rebuild to varying degrees since the genocide ended, Burundi has recently reverted into political crisis. Violence broke out all over the country after the President of Burundi announced his intention to run for a third term in 2015. The crisis in Burundi left several hundred people injured and thousands more displaced.

The Burundi situation is an example of the new tactic that autocratic rulers are using to solidify their grip on power: extending term limits. Tanzania is the only country in the region where this phenomenon has not yet occurred. Thus far, Tanzania has been able to honor presidential term limits, hold peaceful elections, and have peaceful government transitions. Tanzania is also the only country in this region that has not experienced political violence or a political crisis since gaining its independence. Djibouti, Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda, by contrast all have long-serving presidents.

Presidential Tenure: East Africa (2016)		
Country	Current President	In Office Since:
Burundi	Pierre Nkurunziza	2005
Djibouti	Ismail Omar Guelle	1999
Eritrea	Isaias Afwerki	1991
Ethiopia	Hailemariam Desalegn	2013
Kenya	Uhuru Kenyatta	2013
Rwanda	Paul Kagame	2000
Somalia	Hassan Sheikh Mohamud	2012
South Sudan	Salva Kirr	2011
Sudan	Omar Al-Bashir	1989
Tanzania	John Magufuli	2015
Uganda	Yoweri Museveni	1987

Overall, governance issues, weak militaries, and collapsed security structures also contribute to political conflicts in this region. The security situation in this region remains fragile due to the multiple threats facing the region, including environmental threats and terrorism.

Economic Overview

Why Economy and Infrastructure Matter to You as a Marine

The goods and services that people exchange, the infrastructure that people use to move them, and the formal and informal structures that make exchange possible all play critical roles in survival. A thorough understanding of a region is impossible without knowledge of its economy because the region's political, social, and cultural trends both reflect and shape economic developments and trends.

Nature of Economic Systems

There are various economic systems in East Africa, including a traditional economic system based on pastoralism and agriculture. This is especially evident in rural communities, where subsistence production is localized, many times cashless, and often unregulated by the central government. There are numerous communities that co-exist alongside each other and trade milk for grain. Similarly, fishing communities such as the Luo of Kenya practice subsistence fishing, and trade fish for agricultural products or sell smoked fish to supplement their household income. Farmers also sell surplus food in local markets, enhancing the reach of a cash-based economy at the local level.

Additionally, traditional banking systems such as *hawala* are used extensively in this region.⁸⁸ *Hawala* is a parallel banking system that exists outside of formal structures.⁸⁹ *Hawala* banking is based on trust; families often use this informal financial system to remit money across great distances to family or friends.

Hawala is popular because it is fast, cheap, and reliable. *Hawala* functions outside regulation; it does not leave any record and is not subject to taxation.

The other type of economic system in this region is the market economy which is reliant on oil, tourism, and commercial agriculture. However, instability and the presence of aid organizations that provide direct and indirect assistance to refugees and displaced populations —sometimes in the absence of government—have created a hybrid economy. One instance of the hybrid economy can be seen in barter trade, whereby refugees exchange food aid with locals for firewood, soap, and other supplies.

Economic Trends

This region is evolving from traditional economic systems to formalized economic systems. One obvious example in the financial sector is its increased use of mobile money platforms.

Mobile-Money

The increased use of cell phones in this region has given rise to formal mobile money transfer systems such as M-Pesa ('M' for 'Mobile' and 'Pesa' means money in Swahili). This concept, which was innovated in Kenya, uses a mobile phone platform and has the widest reach, covering remote geographical areas. Unlike *hawala*, mobile money transactions are accounted for and trackable; this is because every mobile money account is registered to a cell phone user. Agents are also registered. This is especially important because of the heightened risk posed by remittances sent via informal platforms. Further, tracking remittances serves to prevent money laundering by criminal cartels that finance terror in the region. In this region, mobile phone cash-transfer systems have overtaken formal banking and cash transfer methods.


How mobile money works

Since its inception in 2007, M-Pesa has experienced exponential growth. The platform surpassed 14 million users in 2012.⁹⁰ Mobile money transfers now account for approximately 2 million transactions daily, which accounts for approximately 60 percent of Kenya's GDP.⁹¹ Today, over 70 percent of the adult population in Kenya uses mobile phones to send and withdraw money, pay bills and as phone "credit" to make calls.⁹²



Mobile money sent between phone users (Source: CAOCL)

Although the countries in this region rely on agriculture and oil, their economies vary widely in terms of GDP growth. Economic indicators suggest that this is a region with a lot of potential, but one whose growth is hindered by corruption and a harsh investment climate directly affected by conflict and the absence of structures that accurately measure growth.



Source: World Bank

The main source of wealth in Sudan and South Sudan is oil, but the GDP does not translate into wealth for the majority. Over 77 percent of its population lives on less than 2 U.S. dollars a day.⁹³ In Rwanda, on the other hand, a country that is heavily dependent of agriculture and has seen significant conflict in its recent past, the population has seen gains because the government has had considerable success in its fight against corruption.

Industries

Tourism

Tourism in this region has contributed directly and indirectly to job creation, the demand for local products like furniture, the transportation sector, and other homegrown businesses. Additionally, there are thousands of aid workers, humanitarian workers, and expatriates working throughout the region who directly and indirectly contribute to the tourism sector. The tourism industry supports thousands of workers in the hospitality, transportation, and tour guide sectors; which together account for millions of dollars each year.

Although terrorism, conflict, and instability in this region have hampered tourism, some countries are making strides in the tourism sector. Many of the countries in this region boast a wide array of tourist attractions, but Kenya, Ethiopia, and Tanzania have consistently been the major tourist destinations in East Africa.

Because of the rich potential of the tourism industry, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda have created a special tourist visa to encourage visitors to embark on a tour of those countries. The three countries have also invested in joint marketing strategies to bring tourists into the region. Kenya and Tanzania are major destinations for those seeking a Safari adventure, while Ethiopia is home to 10 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) heritage sites. UNESCO heritage sites are selected for their uniqueness and cultural significance. Of concern to the sector are the negative impacts of terrorism on the tourism industry. In Kenya especially, tourism numbers dwindled after the Westgate Mall terror attack in 2013. Since then, the government has worked to enhance security and assure prospective visitors that Kenya is a peaceful and safe destination.

Rwanda, in particular, has recovered well since the 1994 genocide. Since then, the country has advanced a “gorilla tourism model” to successfully attract tourists to the region. Virunga National Park, which extends into Uganda, received approximately three million visitors and generated about \$75 million between 2006 and 2013.⁹⁴



Gorilla tourism in Rwanda (Source: VisitVirunga.org)

Rwanda has built on the successes in its tourism sector to embark on "conference tourism." The country is fast becoming a regional hub for meetings and conferences. These conference attendees, in turn, often visit traditional tourist destinations, such as Virunga National Park. Additionally, the government of Rwanda has initiated revenue-sharing programs that benefit communities located close to Virunga National Park.⁹⁵

Another type of tourism becoming increasingly popular in this region is "cause tourism." Visitors make their way to this region to visit coffee and tea plantations, to train with world-class marathon runners, and to help renovate the largest slum in Africa -- all in an effort to "make a change," both for the local community and for themselves. The success of this particular tourism method is not yet measurable; this is because there has been no effort to date to register or track additional revenue from this class of tourist.

Agriculture

Agriculture is a major source of economic revenue and subsistence in East Africa. Agriculture in this region is timed with the seasons, with most crops grown during the rainy season and harvested at the beginning of the dry season.

This region's agricultural products are produced for domestic and export markets. Corn and most vegetables (grown largely on family farms) are consumed locally. Large industrial farms produce coffee, tea, and flowers for the export market. Because these exporting countries rely on profits from just a few commodities, their economies are vulnerable to bad weather, plant diseases, and uncertainties in the global marketplace.⁹⁶ Another hindrance is the ability of farmers to access traders. Most rural populations in one geographic location often grow the same grain and thus are unable to trade surplus locally. In rural Ethiopia for example, the issue was not just access to traders, but also the ability to enforce a contract. However, local commodity markets have lately been established that enable traders and farmers to interact; this has eradicated waste, making the supply chain more efficient.



A woman prepares commodity for sale (Source: USAID)

Fishing is also a major source of income, and fish is a major source of protein in this region. The rivers and lakes in this region are important to the region's economy -- in terms of strategic value, especially in terms of hydro-power, as well as food security.

Informal Economy

East Africa lacks a sufficient number of formal jobs to offer steady wages to employ people newly arriving to its cities. Many people work as unregistered street vendors, who form the backbone of marketplaces. A large number of these workers in the informal economy are self-employed laborers working in industries as diverse as textiles and construction. Some workers endure dangerous working conditions, and most lack the benefits and job security that come with jobs in the formal economy. Informal commerce is an economic engine in many countries recovering from conflict, especially in South Sudan and Somalia.

The fact that much of the region's economy operates outside the tax system puts a strain on government treasuries and on the few who do pay taxes. Porous borders enable covert trade routes manned by corrupt government agents who run the informal trade routes. Millions of dollars exchange hands between smugglers, middlemen, and local porters every year; and many families depend on this covert trading sector for their daily subsistence. Corruption often plays a significant role in a person's decision to work outside the formal economy. This is because many people believe (rightfully so) that a substantial portion of tax revenue goes into the pockets of government officials instead of paying for legitimate government services.



Vendors selling water (Source: USAID)

Infrastructure

Transportation

Corruption and high tariffs are the greatest hindrances to the flow of goods into and throughout the region. China is the main investor in this region's infrastructure projects.

Currently, railroad links are limited in East Africa. Most public transportation is limited to bus services and taxis traveling between major cities and villages. Buses are unreliable and often unsafe.⁹⁷ Additionally, most roads consist of two lanes, with a few divided highways found mostly in major urban cities. During the rainy season, roads are extremely dangerous; traveling at this time of the year can only be done safely with off-road-capable vehicles. Gas and diesel fuel for vehicles is expensive, especially in land-locked countries in this region. In rural areas, fuel stations are scarce and fuel quality is often poor.

Despite these limitations, both rail and road transport are being expanded. The region has witnessed the construction of a new railway line that begins at the port city of Mombasa, Kenya, and will connect


to Kampala, Uganda, and Kigali, in Rwanda. This railroad project is set to boost regional trade as well as enhance cooperation between countries in the region.

By contrast, air transportation is generally considered to be adequate and has boosted trade ties throughout the region. All countries in this region have at least one international airport that accommodates international, national, and local flights. In most countries, small, private airlines also exist; these private airlines fly out of the many smaller airports that dot the region. This mode of transportation is still too expensive for the general population however, so most people still travel by road.

TACTICAL TIP: Poor infrastructure will likely impact any mission in this region. It is important to plan ahead and to be prepared for all eventualities. There is often no power; no ready access to supplies, and Marines may have to share provisions with international counterparts.

Utilities

Wood and charcoal provide the majority of the region's energy needs—usually for cooking. Oil, electricity, and commercial energy are also used widely in urban centers. Minimal access to electricity, outdated equipment, poor maintenance, and increased demand contribute to power shortages and frequent power outages. Many businesses, upper-class people, and expatriates have diesel-fueled power generators to augment spotty supplies of electricity.



The U.S. plan to bridge the power gap in Africa (Source: USAID)

The U.S. has launched the Power Africa Project to increase access to power in East Africa by utilizing alternative energy sources such as wind, solar, hydropower, natural gas, and geothermal resources.⁹⁸ This program is expected to have a significant impact on the quality of life and the cost of living.

Drought often causes water levels to drop in the lakes and rivers which supply power in Africa. As a result, drought seriously affects the ability of hydroelectric power generators to provide consistent service to many parts of this region.

The region has begun to explore solar energy. Rwanda is at the forefront of the regional solar energy movement; it is investing in a variety of alternative energy sources, including solar. Solar power is currently powering 15,000 homes in Rwanda, and is projected to expand into every home by 2017.⁹⁹

In Kenya, a solar service that loans panels and consoles to rural households for a small fee is already powering 80,000 households. The government has also invested in geothermal power as part of a plan to supplement hydroelectric power. Already, geothermal is



Employees at Olkaria Geothermal power plant in Kenya (Source: Wikipedia)

contributes 22 percent of Kenya's electric energy.¹⁰⁰ Enhanced power supply in homes across this region will enable children to study in the evening and rural hospitals to operate at full capacity with less risk of power outages.

Communications

The quality of service delivered by the region's landline telephone system is poor, but wireless communications systems can match the standards set by any Western mobile telephone service. Several European cell phone companies operate in the area, and cell phones and internet cafes have proliferated in the past decade. Mobile telephone service is a particularly reliable means of communication in most urban centers.¹⁰¹

Internet connectivity, however, remains poor because of limited landline communications and the slow roll-out fiber-optic broadband services. Limited public access to the Internet has slowed economic development in East Africa. Wireless communications solutions are beginning to facilitate better access to the World Wide Web, primarily for people living in cities or near cell phone towers that border major roadways. Across Africa's remote environments, more and more people are connecting to the internet via mobile phones. Many established news outlets across the continent are now competing with social media—particularly Twitter and Facebook, which are accessed via a Short Message Service (SMS) platform.

In the 1980s and 1990s, radio was the most popular technology in East Africa for news and entertainment. Because of its wide broadcast reach, radio was also leveraged to topple governments in several countries; even to mobilize Hutu militias in the 1994 Rwanda genocide. Today, the mobile phone is the most effective communications device, transforming text messaging into effective “narrowcasts” for targeted public service announcements, especially during looming crises—natural or man-made. However, the new medium does not always communicate a constructive message. Mobile phones are also widely used by transnational terrorist organizations, criminal groups, and militias to plan and coordinate attacks.



Cellphone use in Africa (Source: USAID)

Mass Media

Most families in urban centers have access to television broadcasts and international media outlets. In rural areas, poverty and limited power infrastructure limit the ability of people to access television and the internet. Radios tend to be the most important source of information in these outlying areas. Each country also has multiple TV stations, print newspapers, and a variety of online news outlets.¹⁰²

Press freedom in most East African countries is nominal at best. The situation is considerably better in Kenya and Tanzania, where freedom of the press is a constitutional guarantee; regardless, that is not adhered to in law and practice by all stakeholders. Ethiopia, in particular, constitutionally guarantees freedom of the press, but imposes strict criminal provisions that limit press communication. As of 2015, 17 journalists have been jailed for violating Ethiopia's communications laws.¹⁰³

English-language Mass Media

Countries where English is an official language (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda) have English-language TV, radio, and newspapers. English-language media, especially newspapers and online news outlets, may be found in other countries as well.¹⁰⁴ Swahili- and Arabic-language news services (as well as local radio and TV networks) are also beginning to thrive; all have become an essential sources of information for many people living in this region.

TACTICAL TIP: Most people in this region get their news from local radio outlets. However, the BBC World Service has a wide reach and usually covers significant world events.

Television broadcasting is also most common in urban centers, but the radio is still the most commonly used medium because it is affordable.

Newspapers are mostly distributed in urban centers, and only among the literate. Newspaper readership is linked not just to literacy; there is also an economic link. Few people can afford to pay the price of a newspaper. However, many more people are able to access television broadcasts through a family member or a neighbor who owns a TV. It is common to see neighbors come together to watch an important newscast or a football match; it is even more common to see three to four people share a newspaper.


Regional Security Issues

Why Regional Security Issues Matter to You as a Marine

A thorough understanding of a region is difficult without an account of its most significant security challenges. These challenges tend to affect not only relations between states in the region but also the behavior of its people and the choices they make. Regional security issues encompass a host of topics ranging from wars between states, to insurgencies, to organized crime, to weak institutions, to systemic corruption. Some of them involve violence, while others weaken states and societies and have the potential to turn low level conflicts into violent confrontations.

Introduction

The East Africa region has endured several security challenges in recent years. The volatile climate of this region also makes it one of the most vulnerable regions in Africa. Environmental and climatic challenges have led to drought, famine, and increased food insecurity. These conditions have exacerbated the security situation, as cross-border communities compete for water and pasture. Additionally, the political environment has sometimes escalated tensions, especially around election periods. For example, post-election violence in Kenya in 2007 left 1,200 people dead and displaced another 500,000.¹⁰⁵ Burundi also continues to experience political instability and violence since an attempted coup in May, 2015.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, countries such as Somalia have experienced a myriad of security challenges that have contributed to ongoing instability in the region.



Refugee camps in Sudan and South Sudan (Source: Medecins Sans Frontiers/Doctors Without Borders)

Regional security threats include terrorism, cross-border cattle rustling, human trafficking, and an illegal arms trade. The Kenya-Somali border in particular has been an area of concern because members

of the Al-Shabaab terror group have taken advantage of the insecure border to launch attacks in Kenya. Additionally, Somalia's volatility has caused approximately 500,000 Somali refugees to seek refuge in Kenya.¹⁰⁷

At the same time, though Sudan and South Sudan found an amicable political solution to the North-South divide, and although South Sudan is now an independent state, tensions persist. There are over 200,000 refugees living in South Sudan who have fled the violence in Sudan's South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.¹⁰⁸ In Darfur, the conflict thus far has claimed over 400,000 lives and left more than 2.6 million displaced.¹⁰⁹ In December 2013, political violence in South Sudan broke out after an attempted *coup* displaced thousands of civilians in and around the Unity State (South Sudan), which borders Sudan. Inter-ethnic rivalries have continued to impact communities in South Sudan since it gained independence in 2011.

Although East Africa is complex, and the security issues are numerous, this section will only discuss five main root causes of instability which directly impact U.S. strategic goals. They include:

- **Terrorism**
- **Armed Groups**
- **Ethnic Conflict**
- **Political Conflict**
- **Other Transnational Issues**

Terrorism

There are two types of terror threats in this region. The first type of threat originates from insurgent groups within a country targeting the state; the second threat comes from outside groups attacking a specific target in another state. Examples, respectively, of these two threats are the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Al-Shabaab.

The LRA had its genesis as an insurgent group in 1987 in Uganda fighting against the government of Uganda. The LRA became a regional threat in the 1990s, and was later classified as a terror group by the U.S. State Department in 2001.

Al-Shabaab began as an offshoot of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia in 2006, and fought against the newly formed formal government. Soon after, it began launching attacks outside Somalia.

The LRA claims to be a Christian fundamentalist group; Al-Shabaab claims to follow Islamic precepts. Unlike other armed groups in East Africa, Al-Shabaab and the LRA have both been classified as terror groups by the U.S. Department of State. The U.S. is working with regional governments to counter the threats posed by these groups.

Recommended Reading:

To read more about East Africa's security challenges see:

East Africa page (International Crisis Group)
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa.aspx>

Political and Security Trends on East Africa (Center for Strategic and International Studies)
<http://csis.org/program/east-africa-forum>

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

The LRA has been in existence since 1986; it is Africa's oldest, most persistent, and most violent insurgent group. The group was started by Alice Lakwena from remnants of the Uganda People's Democratic Army, which was comprised of the Acholi ethnic group in northern Uganda. The group purportedly fights for the interests of the Acholi people of Northern Uganda. In 1987, the current-day Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, led the National Resistance Army to overthrow the previous Ugandan President, Tito Okello, an Acholi. Okello's tribe, the Acholi, fled from northern Uganda into neighboring Sudan. Alice Lakwena, who claimed to have mystic powers, then led an insurgency against the new regime (Museveni's).



Joseph Kony (Source: US State Dept.)

Consequently, Joseph Kony, the current leader of the LRA, rose out of this movement.¹¹⁰ The insurgency continues to this day.

The LRA has executed a brutal campaign against the civilian population by killing, maiming, and abducting children in Uganda. More widely, the LRA has committed mass atrocities, including forcibly recruiting and indoctrinating children and forcing them to fight as child soldiers. Reports show that between 1987 and 2006, over 20,000 children were abducted for use as child soldiers or sex slaves. Additionally, the LRA displaced over 2 million people in northern Uganda alone.¹¹¹

The Ugandan government has responded to this threat through dialogue and military action. Military operations targeting the LRA include a 2002 counterinsurgency campaign, "Operation Iron Fist". Later, in 2008, Uganda launched "Operation Lightning Thunder," which was also aimed to counter and pursue the LRA.

The LRA has been designated a terrorist group by the African Union and the United States, and although "Operation Lightning Thunder" has experienced challenges, it has dealt somewhat of a blow to the movement and prevented further harm to some of the civilian population in this region.

After losing its home base in Uganda due to increasing pressure and loss of public support, the LRA now operates in the neighboring countries of South Sudan, Darfur in Sudan, northeast DRC, and the Central African Republic (CAR).¹¹² In 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama signed the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act and deployed U.S. troops to support "Operation Lightning Thunder."¹¹³ The ICC has issued indictments against Joseph Kony for crimes against humanity including murder, abduction, sexual enslavement, and mutilation, among others, and war crimes committed against the civilian population.¹¹⁴ Joseph Kony is yet to be captured.

Al-Shabaab

The origins of Al-Shabaab can be traced back to 2006, when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an umbrella organization of Islamist organizations that advocated for *Sharia* to be the rule of law throughout Somalia. The ICU clerics formed Sharia courts across the country. Judgments by these courts were enforced by clan militia.¹¹⁵

The last stronghold to be taken over by the ICU was in Mogadishu in 2004 with the establishment of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG was an internationally-backed governing authority that was meant to pave way for a stable elected government in Somalia following almost 20 years of instability. The TFG experienced resistance from the various informal governing structures across the country that were in place following the disintegration of the Somali national government in 1991. The entry of the TFG in the political arena sparked an ideological war between the various clans. Violence in Mogadishu escalated when clan militia, while trying to enforce *Sharia* law, began defending the courts against the TFG, which by that time was attempting to create new governing structures.¹¹⁶ Politicians began using clan militia to settle political scores and target TFG supporters.¹¹⁷ Ethiopia backed the newly formed TFG, owing to the fact that Somalia's ungoverned spaces posed a threat to Ethiopia. The ICU, in turn, responded by using clan militia to attack pro-TFG, Ethiopian troops.

The ICU militia, drawn from all clans, was the same militia used to enforce the rulings of the ICU courts. To more effectively counter the pro-TFG advance, the ICU militia organized into a military force known as Al-Shabaab (Arabic for, “the youth”) in 2006. Al-Shabaab began actively recruiting, which was an easy task because many Somalis already considered Ethiopia to be an enemy. This is largely due to a history of violence between the two countries dating back to 1964. Additionally, a Soviet-backed war against Somalia in 1977 further aggravated the Somali-Ethiopian relationship.

Later, in 1991, after the ousting of President Said Barre, *al-Itihaad al-Islami* a Somali Islamic nationalist group went to war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, an area inhabited by ethnic Somalis. The leader of *al-Itihaad al-Islami*, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, later founded the ICU.¹¹⁸ In 2008, the group pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda¹¹⁹; in 2009, the ICU lost Mogadishu to Ethiopian troops.¹²⁰

By this time, the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was stood up to bolster the TFG and allow for humanitarian access. Ethiopian troops withdrew and AMISOM forces, comprised of Ugandan and Burundian troops, became Al-Shabaab's new target.¹²¹ Al-Shabaab also began recruiting youth within Somalia, and even as far away as Minneapolis.¹²² Subsequently, the group began targeting Uganda, Djibouti, and Kenya. Between 2010 and 2015, Al-Shabaab took responsibility for eight major attacks in the region that claimed approximately 350 lives.¹²³

The first major Al-Shabaab attack that garnered international attention was the 2010 World Cup bombings in Uganda, which targeted Ugandan and Ethiopian nationals.¹²⁴ The history of Ethiopia in Somalia (and Ethiopian collaboration with Uganda in the Africa Union-led peace keeping mission under AMISOM) is believed to have been the motive behind the 2010 World Cup bombings.

Recommended Reading:

For a comprehensive timeline of Al-Shabaab's activities in this region, see:

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
<http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468>

Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia by Anneli Botha and Mahdi Abdile (Institute for Security Studies)
<https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf>

The next major Al-Shabaab assault was the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya in 2013, which took 67 lives and left approximately 170 people wounded. The attack was significant because 19 of the 67 victims were non-Kenyan nationals.¹²⁵ The shopping mall attack was the first of its kind for the group. Westgate, owned by an Israeli company¹²⁶, was a meeting venue for expatriates and a symbol of a Western-leaning lifestyle. Most analysts agree that the attack was meant to send a message to the West.

In 2015, Al-Shabaab changed tactics and began targeting communities living close to the Kenya-Somali border. A porous border made for easy access. The group targeted Christians working at a quarry mine, travelling in buses, and at a university, all in Garissa County, which borders Somalia.¹²⁷

Al-Shabaab's change of tactics was meant to create a religious wedge between communities. However, Kenya's wedge issues have historically centered on ethnicity and economic access, not religion. The group has also adopted guerilla tactics to attack AMISOM forces in Somalia, and used suicide bombers to launch targeted attacks against strategic installations like foreign embassies and Somali government buildings in Mogadishu.

The U.S. is working with governments in this region to counter Al-Shabaab's threat. This partnership has resulted in the elimination of high-value terrorists, including Al-Shabaab's leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, in September 2014.

Armed Groups

There are many armed groups operating in East Africa. Their origins and motives are diverse, so there is no single root cause for their existence. For example, militia such as the Janjaweed in Sudan are backed by the state, while the White Army in South Sudan is an insurgent group fighting against the state. The difference between the insurgent groups discussed in this section, as well as Al-Shabaab and the LRA, is that the U.S. State Department has classified both Al-Shabaab and LRA as terror groups. This section will look at the groups that have adversely impacted the stability of the entire region, regardless of not having been specifically designated by the U.S. as terrorist organizations.

Sudan: JEM and Janjaweed

In Sudan, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) organized militia cells in Darfur and Khartoum in 1993. It was only after 2000, when they began acting alongside the Sudan Liberation Army, another rebel group, that they were seen as a significant threat by the Khartoum government.¹²⁸ The Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), is another militia group operating in Darfur and across the border in Chad.¹²⁹ In addition to these groups, the group Janjaweed operates with impunity within Darfur.¹³⁰

The conflict in Darfur impacted the relationship between Sudan and Chad, leading both governments to back opposing rebel groups. JEM's initial backer was the national government in Chad; however, Libya also funneled millions to JEM to destabilize Sudan's government.¹³¹ JEM has also been active in South Sudan in support of the government in its fight against rebel groups such as "the White Army" in Unity State. The White Army is a rebel group operating in Unity State; it is comprised of members of the Nuer ethnic group – the second largest ethnic group in South Sudan. The Nuer and the Dinka, the largest ethnic group in South Sudan, have engaged in political and ethnic feuds over the last 20 years. The most recent conflict followed an attempted coup in 2013.

Government forces, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has been fighting the white Army in Unity State, a region in South Sudan which has a Nuer majority.

In addition to JEM, the Janjaweed militia is another group that has caused civilian deaths and mass displacement in Sudan and Chad. The Sudanese government had officially distanced itself from the group because of the mass atrocities is militia committed in the Darfur region. However, in 2014, the Janjaweed militia was reconstituted under the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of the Sudanese paramilitary and deployed in support of the government's counter insurgency campaign in Darfur.¹³² This newly constituted Janjaweed (RSF) force is better equipped and has integrated former Janjaweed militia as commanders and fighters, which in effect grants them immunity "for any acts committed in the course of duty".¹³³ The RSF is by no means reformed; they have the capacity to destabilize the region. The UN estimates that over 300,000 people have been displaced in Darfur since the resurgence of the conflict in January 2014.¹³⁴

South Sudan: White Army

The independence of South Sudan in 2011 converted the South Sudan People's Liberation Army from an armed group fighting for the liberation of South Sudan to the new nation's official army. However, an alleged *coup* in December 2013 sparked a civil war pitting rebel groups against the new government and its recently legitimized army.¹³⁵ Leading up to this incident, cattle rustling between the Nuer and the Dinka tribes had taken a toll on communities and livelihoods in Jonglei province in particular, displacing over 100,000 people. Soon after the alleged *coup*, the Nuer White Army, which had previously focused on protecting its own cattle, organized a 50,000-strong army to fight against the South Sudan government forces in support of Riek Machar, the leader of the opposition.¹³⁶

Fighting in South Sudan decreased after the government and opposition forces signed a peace deal in Addis Ababa in November 2014, but tensions persist.¹³⁷ The rebel groups in South Sudan, now known more formally as the White Army, have not been disarmed. They continue to pose a threat to national and regional security, especially because of the vast oil reserves located there and their vulnerability to attack.

Ethnic Conflict

This region is especially vulnerable to ethnic tensions rooted in historical injustices, marginalization, and competition for natural resources. Some of the major ethnic conflicts in this region include the

Recommended Reading:

For more on conflict Sudan, see:

Governance and Conflict in the Sahel's 'Ungoverned Space' by Clionadh Raleigh and Caitriona Dowd (International Journal Stability of Security & Development)
<http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.bs/96#cc-by>

Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
<http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/13/organized-crime-and-conflict-in-sahel-sahara-region>

In 2013, three CV-22 Osprey aircraft on an evacuation mission were shot at by rebel groups in South Sudan's Unity State at the height of the conflict. Three service members were injured in the operation. (BBC News)

genocide in Rwanda and Burundi, the genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan, clan cleansing in Somalia, and ethnic tensions in Kenya. All of these situations have destabilized East Africa, leading to the loss of life and the displacement of thousands.

Genocide in Rwanda and Burundi

Ethnic violence in this region is a result of perceived social, economic, historical, or political issues between the hundreds of different ethnic groups which share the regional space. Rwanda and Burundi, which have parallel pasts of sharp tensions between the two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, provide a good example of ethnicity as a conflict driver in Africa.¹³⁸

Historical accounts in Rwanda and Burundi indicate that the Belgian colonial authority in the 1920s employed Tutsis in government, creating a Tutsi monopoly which bred animosity between the Tutsi and the Hutu.¹³⁹ The tensions led to a Hutu uprising in 1959, which precipitated the exile of thousands of Tutsis to neighboring countries.¹⁴⁰ After the independence of both Rwanda and Burundi, tensions endured and by the 1980s, more than 480,000 Tutsi refugees in neighboring counties were mounting pressure on the government to allow for their return.¹⁴¹ Soon after, a rebel movement rose up, and in October 1990, a war broke out when the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RFA) invaded a Rwandan border post from Uganda.¹⁴²



Rwanda Genocide Memorial (Source: Geckos Adventure)

The RFA was the military arm of the rebel group called Rwandese Patriotic Front which had been arming and training in Uganda. France and Belgium intervened militarily and helped quash the invasion. France sent 600 troops and Belgium sent 400.

However, the official singular trigger of the 1994 genocide is often considered to have been the crash of the presidential plane on its way back from the Arusha Peace Summit. Rwanda President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira were both killed when the Rwanda presidential jet was shot down on its way back from the Arusha Peace Summit in Tanzania in April 1994.¹⁴³ This incident saw Hutu militia organized under the moniker of *Interahamwe* (those who fight together), who embarked on systematic machete killings aimed at eliminating the Tutsi ethnic group altogether.

The Rwandan genocide resulted in the deaths of over one million people and the displacement of thousands more.¹⁴⁴ The killings had been planned and executed using government resources and structure, which had until then painted the Tutsi as the enemy. In response, the Hutu mobilized to eliminate the former government as an act of self-defense.¹⁴⁵

Recommended Reading:

To read more about the Rwanda Genocide see:

The Rwandan Genocide: How It was Prepared (Human Rights Watch)
<http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/rwanda/0406/rwanda0406.pdf>

The Triumph of Evil (PBS)
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/>

The Rwandan Genocide: 20 years later
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/>

The genocide created an influx of refugees to the region. This was the beginning of a host of regional issues that continue to pose challenges to regional and global security.

Tutsi Exiles in the Region in 1994	
Points of Concentration	Approximate figures
Northern Burundi	270,000
Western Tanzania	577,000
Southwestern Uganda	10,000
DRC (3 camps)	1,244,000

Source: UNHCR Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi as of November 16, 1994

Twenty years have passed since the 1994 genocide, and both countries have made tremendous strides socially, politically, and economically. However, there are still remnants of the conflict in the region. Burundi is still fragile and has experienced sporadic violence that rose out of a decision by the president to seek a third term in office in early 2015. The stability of both countries—and the region—remains in a calculated balance that weighs political and economic advancement against the backdrop of a past marred with violence.

Ethnic Violence in Kenya

The root cause of mass political conflict in Kenya is competition over land. Land was at the core of the struggle for independence, when the first post-colonial government in 1963 failed to fairly and equitably distribute land to Kenya's new citizenry. The adjudication of land-related matters has always been shrouded in corruption, political interference, and bureaucratic fiefdoms. Legal redress is not accessible to locals, whose cumulative frustration has caused them to lose faith in the country's vital political and legal institutions. As a result, many people have turned to violence to settle their legal claims. The former President Daniel Arap Moi's government (1978-2002) further exploited land issues, especially in Kenya's Rift Valley. A handful of powerful and connected Kenyans took advantage of the fluid, informal lease arrangements in the valley, by—in effect—stealing land from the poor.

The Rift Valley rests at the center of all political disputes that plague Kenya today—namely, the politicization of the land issue and pervasive corruption in the issuance of title deeds. These ills are the cause of the mass violence that revisit certain parts of the Rift Valley every election year, pitting the Kalenjin tribe (who claim the rift Valley as their ancestral home) against the Kikuyu tribe (who are sometimes referred to as "visitors" from the Central province). Ethnic cleansing of Kikuyus from the Rift Valley have occurred every election year since 1998.¹⁴⁶

The 2007 elections, however, brought the Rift Valley land issue to the national level. Following the elections, violence erupted between supporters of the two main political parties: the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM).

The PNU presidential candidate was from the Kikuyu tribe, and the ODM presidential candidate was from the Luo tribe. The ODM candidate had massive support in the Rift Valley province. When the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) announced the results and declared the PNU candidate as the newly elected president, violence immediately broke out in the Rift Valley. The violence targeted

members of the Kikuyu ethnic group as well as members of tribes viewed as aligned to the Kikuyu, either by culture and language or by voting pattern. Most tribes vote as a block; in this case, the two major parties had the backing of specific ethnic groups. Kikuyu militia, known as ‘*Mungiki*,’ launched revenge killings against “enemy tribes” in the Rift Valley province. The violence left 1,200 people dead and displaced more than 600.¹⁴⁷

Ethnic tensions persist in Kenya. Though no violence resulted from the election in 2013, the results of the election nonetheless served as a reminder of the 2007 election. The winners in 2013, Uhuru Kenyatta as President and William Ruto as Deputy President, had both been indicted for crimes against humanity for their alleged roles in the violence that broke out after the 2007 elections by the ICC.

There have lately been reforms in the land laws. The government is now working to allocate land to more Kenyans. Additionally, a hate speech law is now in place to help pacify ethnic tensions. Despite these initiatives, the country is still deeply split along ethnic lines. The war crimes case against President Uhuru Kenyatta was dropped, but there are two similar cases relating to the 2007 elections still pending before the ICC. Kenya is a regional economic hub and is engaged in a war in Somalia. It is therefore critical for its government to resolve issues that may pose a threat to its stability.

Recommended Reading:

To read more about the Ethnic Violence in Kenya see:

In-depth: Kenya’s Post-Election Crisis (IRIN News)
<http://www.irinnews.org/in-depth/76116/68/kenya-s-post-election-crisis>

Kenya Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011, by Daniel Branch (Yale University Press, 2011)

Sudan’s Darfur Conflict

In early 2003 the government of Sudan embarked on an ethnic cleansing campaign against Darfuris for allegedly supporting an insurgency against the central government. The ethnic cleansing campaign led to the death of approximately 300,000 people and the displacement of two million more.¹⁴⁸ In 2004, the U.S. government officially declared the events in Darfur a genocide.¹⁴⁹

The situation in Darfur is more broadly representative of ethnic violence in this region. Darfur, which means “the land of the *Fur* people,” is in western Sudan, borders Chad to the west, and borders the Central African Republic (CAR) to the south.

Darfur has been embroiled in tribal conflict over land, water, and grazing rights.¹⁵⁰ This dispute has pitted nomadic Arabs against farmers from the *Fur*, *Masalit*, and *Zaghawa* communities. Additionally, because Darfur is fertile, the region attracted Arab tribes from Chad and Libya, resulting in a strain on resources and tensions between the locals and the incomers.¹⁵¹



Source: Wikimedia

In 2003, two non-Arab groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), accused the government of Sudan of neglecting the region and took up arms against the government.¹⁵²

The two groups posed a significant threat to the government of Sudan. There is evidence that the government exploited ethnic tensions by calling upon local tribes to help fight the rebels. The Arab nomadic tribes rose up in support of the government, hoping that they would eventually be allowed to settle in the region.¹⁵³

The government of Sudan also supported the Janjaweed militia to help stem the insurgency.¹⁵⁴ The killing of 400,000 people, the displacement of 2,500,000 refugees from their homes,¹⁵⁵ and the rape of countless women precipitated world-wide scrutiny and protest.¹⁵⁶

In 2004, the United States passed a resolution labeling this conflict a "genocide" under the terms of the United Nations Genocide Convention.¹⁵⁷ Later, in July 2007, the UN Security Council voted to send 26,000 peacekeepers to Darfur to protect civilians.¹⁵⁸ Since that time, violence in Darfur has decreased, but tensions have increased in the same area between the *Berti* and the *Zaghawa* groups over the issue of land ownership.¹⁵⁹

A new surge of clashes erupted in Darfur in early 2013, forcing the internal displacement of an additional 250,000 people; some 30,000 people crossed the border from Darfur into Chad.¹⁶⁰ There are currently over 350,000 Sudanese refugees living in East Chad.¹⁶¹ Additionally, recent environmental threats (and resultant food crises) have required an influx of additional U.S. humanitarian assistance and more support from the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).¹⁶²

Clan Cleansing In Somalia

The term "clan cleansing" has been coined to define the use of force to remove or eliminate members of a clan from an area in the same way ethnic cleansing is used to eliminate members of an ethnic group from a geographical area. Somali society is unlike others in this region, as it is the one ethnic group that is also a nation state. Somalia is also unique because of its clan segmentation. All clans fall under six main clan families. The *Daarood*, *Hawiye*, *Isaaq* and *Dir* clans are primarily nomadic and pastoralist, while the *Digil* and *Rahanwayn* clans are dependent on agriculture.¹⁶³

Clans have been used to conquer and rule Somalia for decades; instability only made it more likely for certain clans to solidify their control over a territory. *Isaaq* is the largest and strongest clan; historically, it has been a power player. Said Barre, who led a bloodless *coup* to oust Somali's *Isaaq*-led government in 1969, survived a *coup* mounted by officers in the *Majerteen* clan in 1978. The *Majerteen* is a sub-clan of the *Daarood* clan to which President Barre belonged. Barre's aim was to promote the smaller clans – the *Marehan*, the *Ogadeed* and the *Dolbahante* -- alongside the already dominant *Hawiye* clan in the civil service. (These three groups are also sub-clans of the *Daarood*, but are much smaller than the *Majerteen*). The government of Said Barre used these three sub-clans to alienate the *Majerteen* and the *Isaaq*. This was the genesis of clan cleansing in Somalia.

The Somali government isolated the *Isaaq*; this move by President Barre prompted leading *Isaaq* clan members abroad to organize a guerilla militia known as the Somali National Movement (SNM). In 1988, SNM unsuccessfully attempted to oust Said Barre. This failed *coup* triggered clan warfare that

led to the 1991 civil war. The unsuccessful *coup* also marked the beginning of the use of clan militia by politicians to achieve their own means. Militia groups are organized along clan lines – there are numerous accounts of revenge killings against clans, such as the *Daarood*, that had been friendly to Said Barre’s government.

Barre’s government organized displacement camps for the *Ogadeed* in *Isaaq* territory. When the inevitable *Ogadeed-Isaaq* clashes began, the government backed the *Ogadeed*.

After civil war broke out in Somalia 1991, the official government dissipated and clans occupied the place of government. Because many clans were already embroiled in historical feuds over resources, community leaders who had been in politics prior to 1991 began to use clan militia to claim urban and agricultural land. Larger clans were granted large swathes of land, displacing smaller ones. This also increased the migration of smaller clans to neighboring countries in search of economic opportunities. These displaced clan members joined many other conflict-driven Somali refugees seeking safety in Ethiopia and Kenya.

Because clan leaders represent the interests of their clans and are central to decision-making in Somali society, many of these clan leaders have risen to prominent leadership positions -- politically and economically. These leaders are stakeholders in the peace process; they work actively with the government towards stabilizing Somalia.

Political Conflict

Sudan/South Sudan Border Demarcation Dispute

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 between Sudan and South Sudan ended two decades of civil war and stipulated the demarcation of the border between the north and south Sudan, granting South Sudan independence. South Sudan gained its independence on 9 July 2011, yet the ill-defined border issues remained unresolved to this day, often referred to as the Abyei Stalemate.¹⁶⁴

A series of agreements were signed between the two countries to resolve the issue, but the unresolved Abyei area, remains contentious. The disagreement stems from the definition of the term “residents” of the Abyei area. Semi-nomadic Arab Misseriya travel through Abyei seasonally, while the African Ngok Dinka permanently reside in Abyei. This dispute remains a source of tension between the two groups.¹⁶⁵ This border region was the site of a series of clashes in the first half of 2012, when South Sudan invaded Hejlilj, leading to widespread international condemnation.¹⁶⁶

Abyei Stalemate

Competition for natural resources, particularly oil, plays a major role in the Abyei dispute. The Abyei Protocol grants Abyei special administrative status and guarantees the “residents” of Abyei a referendum to decide if they want to be part of Sudan or South Sudan. The referendum was to have been conducted simultaneously with the referendum of South Sudan in January 2011, but it did not take place. Disagreement arose regarding the composition of the Abyei Referendum Commission created to manage the process and make crucial decisions such as establishing the criteria for residency status.¹⁶⁷



Abyei Region (Source: Voice of America)

Abyei became a major battleground in the Sudanese civil war, displacing tens of thousands of inhabitants, mostly Dinka Negok.¹⁶⁸ In 2011, a series of clashes erupted between “armed elements associated with Arab nomads and local police” that caused villages to be burned and the killing of more than 100 people.¹⁶⁹

Recommended Reading:

For more information on Abyei and the relationship between Sudan South Sudan, see:

Update on Abyei (Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan, Small Arms Survey)


<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/borderdisputed-areas/abyei.html>

The Other Five Disputed Areas

The border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan occur mainly because the border land is rich in oil reserves, consists of fertile land for agriculture, and provides grazing areas crucial to seasonal transhumant pastoralist groups.

Other disputed areas include:

- **Kaka** - Located between Upper Nile in South Sudan and Southern Kordofan in Sudan.
- **Megenis Mountain (Jebel Megenis)** - Located between Upper Nile in South Sudan and Southern Kordofan in Sudan.
- **Dabat Alfakhar (South of Jodah)** - Located between Upper Nile in South Sudan and White Nile in Sudan.
- **Kafia Kingi and Hofrat al-Nahas** - Located between Western Bahral-Ghazal in South Sudan and Southern Darfur in Sudan.
- **Safaha (also called 14 miles)** - Located between Northern Bahral-Ghazal in South Sudan and Southern Darfur in Sudan.



Disputed Regions in Sudan and South Sudan (Source: Political Geography Now)

Because the border between Sudan and South Sudan remains contested, ongoing tensions could possibly lead to a war between the two countries, further destabilizing the already vulnerable region. Any worsening of the security situation is expected to directly involve the U.S. The U.S. is seen as a key player in the region due to its role in the peace process and the referendum for South Sudanese independence. When fighting broke out in South Sudan in 2013, the U.S. was a key supporter of the mediation process and a key provider of humanitarian aid. As a result of the renewed violence, U.S. Marines evacuated American nationals from the areas hardest hit by rebels.¹⁷⁰



U.S. Marines evacuate U.S. nationals from South Sudan
(Source: U.S. Marine Corps)

Other Transnational Issues

Small Arms Proliferation

One of the most significant security challenges in this region is the easy access to small arms and light weapons. The political stability of the region has had a direct relationship to small arms proliferation in this region. For example, in 1979, an armory raid in a military barracks in northern Uganda led to an increase in cattle rustling incidents in northern Kenya. The overthrow of Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia in 1991 led to an increased flow of arms southward into Kenya and Somalia. The overthrow of Somali President Said Barre in 1991 marked the beginning of an unprecedented flow of arms across the region, especially into the neighboring country of Kenya.¹⁷¹ Today, arms trafficking is a particular security concern in this region because the availability of weapons could increase instability in South Sudan, Somalia, and Burundi.

Most illegal small arms in the more stable countries in this region (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia) are trafficked along the porous borders and waterways. In 2001, a Somali *dhow* (small wooden boat) delivered approximately 500 rifles and grenade launchers to a local warlord.¹⁷² In Kenya, arms tracking organizations say that corruption in the police service has perpetuated the influx of small arms in the country.¹⁷³ Arms are reportedly obtained from corrupt security officials, from armory raids conducted on police stations, and by purchases on the black market.¹⁷⁴



A team sorts through small arms and other weapons in South Sudan (Source: U.S.DoS)

Because Somalia has a long history of conflict, it has become a source of many illegal arms; arms smugglers easily transfer weapons across Somalia's porous land borders to destinations throughout East Africa. South Sudan is also a source of illicit arms because conditions prior to its independence left thousands of weapons in the hands of civilians.¹⁷⁵ Although rebel South Sudanese forces were absorbed into the military (there have been many weapons handover ceremonies since 2011), there are still huge quantities of military-style small arms in the hands of civilians and armed groups.¹⁷⁶

Additionally, South Sudan lacks the ability to manage surplus arms; storage facilities currently in use are not well secured. The South Sudanese government does not have the capacity to systematically destroy weapons; this posed a problem in 2013 when a political crisis evolved into conflict.¹⁷⁷ Because there were unaccounted and unsecured weapons in many areas, rebels were able to organize within a very short period of time and wage a resistance against government forces in the north. The situation in South Sudan remains fragile; there is a need for a strategy on how to best manage weapons held by civilians.

Access to Water

In East Africa access to water for commercial and domestic use has led to conflict. More importantly, access to strategic waters such as those of the Nile have led to tensions between countries. The Blue Nile and its Ethiopian tributaries generate 75 to 85 percent of the Nile's annual flow; the White Nile, another tributary of the Nile in Uganda, generates the remaining flow.¹⁷⁸

Regional tensions have been created by Egypt's overreliance on the Nile River for agriculture, hydroelectric power, and tourism; coupled with East Africa's deficiency in electrical power.

In May 2013, Ethiopia diverted the flow of the Nile River to make way for a massive, \$4.2 billion hydroelectric dam called the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (sometimes referred to as the Hidase Dam). This dam is about 25 mi (40 km) east of Ethiopia's border with Sudan. When completed, this 6,000-megawatt dam will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa. The Hidase Dam is a critical development project for Ethiopia and the region.¹⁷⁹

Uganda also has several hydroelectric dam projects on the White Nile: the 250-megawatt Bujagali Dam (nearing completion) and the 600-megawatt Karuma Dam.¹⁸⁰

Egypt has expressed concern that Ethiopian and Ugandan hydropower projects will diminish its share of the Nile River, which supplies nearly all its freshwater.¹⁸¹ In 2010, countries along the Nile (the so-called "Nile basin countries") signed a controversial treaty known as the Entebbe Agreement. The Entebbe Agreement was signed by six countries: Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. (South Sudan later joined in 2013.) The agreement between these Nile basin countries was created out of their shared concern over the redistribution of Nile River waters.¹⁸²

The Entebbe Agreement stripped Egypt of its veto power, which had been delineated in a colonial-era treaty: the Nile Waters Agreement drafted in 1929 by Great Britain. The Nile Water Agreement awarded Egypt rights to 90 percent of the Nile's annual flow. Egypt was also accorded "veto power"; which meant that it had the right to oppose the construction of dams like those underway in Ethiopia and Uganda.

Recommended Reading:

For more on the strategic importance of the Nile, see: The Geopolitics of Water in the Nile River Basin (Center for Research on Globalization)
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-geopolitics-of-water-in-the-nile-river-basin/25746>

Strategic Considerations for the Comprehensive Water Resources Development of the Nile River Basin (Canadian Water Resource Journal)
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.4296/cwrj2101003>

Periodically, Egypt threatens to take military action against these dam projects in Ethiopia and Uganda. Egypt does have military options, but distance constrains its ability to project the full force of its military. Additionally, a military option would be risky and would invite severe international consequences.¹⁸³

Illegal Fishing and Piracy

Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania all have a coastline and contend with a range of challenges off their coasts, including piracy and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU). Piracy and armed robbery at sea in the western Indian Ocean and Red Sea have elevated insurance rates and shipping costs, resulting in increased costs to consumers. IUU fishing devastates East African fisheries, which play a vital role in economic growth, food security, and maritime security.¹⁸⁴ Criminal organizations leverage ungoverned maritime space that could also be exploited by violent extremist organizations.

Maritime crimes in Somalia soared in 2005, resulting from the deteriorating economic situation in the country.¹⁸⁵ The inability of Somali fishermen to access fish for their economic livelihood contributed to piracy in the western Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

Somali fishermen eventually grew tired of foreign fishing fleets taking advantage of the country's instability in order to illegally fish and dump toxic waste in their coastal waters. These activities also hampered the economic, environmental, and health of the entire country. Lacking effective Somali government security forces to defend the territorial waters of Somalia, foreign fishing fleets were forced to take control of the country's 2050 mi (3,300 km) coastline.¹⁸⁶

Somali pirate attacks peaked in 2011, with 176 reported cases. Since 2012, international naval patrols and armed guards on ships have limited some of the pirates' activity. The root, and lingering cause of piracy is the destitute conditions in Somalia. Piracy will continue to be a security problem as long as huge portions of Somalia remain ungoverned and lack adequate law enforcement and judicial systems. The pirates operating openly along Somalia's central coast are engaged in a high-profit, low-risk criminal enterprise. They have collected hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom willingly paid by shipping companies anxious to free their vessels and crews.¹⁸⁷



U.S. Navy personnel approach a boat of suspected pirates off the Somali waters in 2011. Source: U.S. Navy

Conclusion

East Africa, and the Horn of Africa in particular, have experienced significant security challenges that have attracted recent international attention. The U.S. has offered assistance to many countries in the region. This American security support has been delivered in the form of capacity-building for Ugandan forces (who are fighting to eliminate the LRA in South Sudan and Uganda), and as assistance

to AMISOM forces operating at the frontlines of counterterrorism operations in Somalia. However, the underlying causes of conflict this region, which are politically and economically diverse, persist; further complicating conditions on the ground.

Case Study: The Somali

The case study in this chapter introduces a culture from the East Africa region, using the concepts introduced in the Operational Culture General (OCG) document (see attached document).

Introduction

This region is home to a diverse conglomeration of ethnic groups. The cultural identity of these groups has evolved over time through migration, geographic access to (and exclusion from) economic opportunity, and interactions with explorers and colonizers.

Although most East Africans are administered by national governments, they typically identify themselves as members of specific ethnic groups. These ethnic groups have lineages that can be traced back several centuries and across several borders. Understanding the genesis, beliefs, and evolution of these groups is important to one's understanding of current regional, ethnic, and cultural dynamics.

Although there are currently millions of Somalis living outside of their homeland, this case study of the Somali population residing in Kenya's North East Province, hereinafter referred to as the NEP, will highlight the importance of cultural identity in this ethnically diverse region.

The Somali

The Somali are an ethnic group found in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia.¹⁸⁸ There are approximately 6.3 million¹⁸⁹ Somalis in Ethiopia, 2.3 million in Kenya¹⁹⁰ and 8.9 million¹⁹¹ in Somalia, including the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland.

Kenya and Ethiopia have hosted over one million Somali refugees over the last 20 years, and although this population has changed, there remain approximately 500,000 Somali refugees in Kenya.¹⁹² Additionally, there is a Somali diaspora spread out in Europe and North America. Minnesota is home to over 100,000 Somalis, with



Somali homeland, shaded above, stretched through three countries in the Horn of Africa (Source: UNESCO)

approximately 30,000 residing in Minneapolis alone.¹⁹³

Although the origin of the Somali tribe is not known, folklore states that they are the descendants of the original inhabitants of the Horn of Africa, the Galla, who intermarried with Arab traders who entered the region before the 1400s.¹⁹⁴ This is also the path that Islam took; Arab influence in this region is attributed to the presence of Arab traders as early as 1400s.¹⁹⁵

In Kenya, the Somali population is concentrated in the NEP and was present in the region before the partitioning of the continent at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). The British colonial conquest of Kenya and the drawing of national borders impacted the Somali population by splitting it across three countries - Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia.

The North Eastern Province (NEP) was referred to as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) during the colonial era. After Kenya's independence in 1963, the country was divided into eight administrative units called provinces. Each province is made up of several counties. The NEP is made up of seven counties.

By the late 1940s, the British colonial government in Kenya was facing harsh resistance; it resolved to pass policies that restricted the movement and association of all Kenyans as a way to contain resistance movements. To do this, the government issued an identity card to every adult in the country which included his or her tribe and area of origin. As a result, all ethnic groups were confined to certain geographic locations. Most ethnic groups were confined within their homelands; others were moved to newly built villages created for the sole purpose of containing them. The Somali people were confined to the counties of Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir within NEP. During the same period, the Somali population outside of Somalia (in Kenya and Ethiopia) organized a political movement to reclaim their homeland. They advocated for the secession of the NFD and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to Somalia.

In 1962, the British colonial government appointed a commission to conduct an official study to determine whether or not to hold a referendum regarding the desire of the Somali population in the NFD to secede to Somalia. The findings of the study indicated that 80 percent of the Somali population in Kenya, now in effect confined to Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir, favored secession from Kenya to Somalia.

The British colonial government did not implement the recommendations of the study; instead, in 1963, it granted independence to the entire country of Kenya, including the regions of Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir. Under the newly formed government, Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir -- and its majority population of Somalis -- were designated as the NEP.¹⁹⁶ Protests ensued. Additionally, Somalia-backed bandits (*Shiftas*) mounted an insurgency to take back part of the NEP. The *Shifita* War, as it was known, was fought against the Kenyan army with the support of British forces.¹⁹⁷

The onset of the *Shifita* War required the Kenyan government to declare a "state of emergency" that authorized security forces to aggressively repel any attack initiated by either Somali government forces or *Shiftas*. Although the *Shifita* War ended in 1967, this state of emergency was not lifted until 1991. This 28-year period was a time when the country's Somali population experienced marginalization, alienation, stigmatization, and victimization.¹⁹⁸

During the state of emergency, Kenyan security forces conducted operations that were largely unchecked, including several massacres. The most significant of these bloodbaths was the Wagalla Massacre in 1984.¹⁹⁹

Like Kenya, Ethiopia also went to war with Somalia to quell the threat of secession. The Ogaden War (1977-1978) was fought to retain the Ogaden region as part of Ethiopia. The Ogaden region of Ethiopia has approximately four million Somalis.

In the decades since the *Shifto* War, there have not been any other attempts by Somalis living in the NEP to secede to Somalia. However, the war against terror has put the NEP back in the regional spotlight because of the number of terror incidents in Kenya. The NEP shares a border with Somalia; Al-Shabaab (a violent resistance group discussed in the previous chapter) freely operates in this region because national borders are so very porous.

Physical Geography

The Somali population in Kenya lives in a tropical climate straddling the equator. The NEP covers approximately 49 sq. mi (127 sq. km), and is comprised of three counties: Garissa (17 sq. mi/44,000 sq. km), Wajir (22 sq. mi/57,000 sq. km), and Mandera (10 sq. mi/26,000 sq. km).²⁰⁰ All three counties are inhabited by a majority Somali population. The NEP has historically been considered a marginalized region because of its remoteness and harsh, arid environment. It has lagged behind, developmentally, compared to other regions in Kenya. The region was under a state of emergency from 1963 to 1991.²⁰¹



Somali homeland in Kenya's North Eastern province (Source: CAOCL)

The terrain of the northern areas close to Ethiopia is marked by hills and ridges with altitudes ranging between 985 - 3,280 ft. (300-1,000 m) while the southern regions have rolling plains and altitudes ranging from 985 ft (300 m) to sea level.²⁰² The area is semi-arid and hot, with temperatures ranging from 82-104°F (28-40°C) year-round. NEP experiences intermittent rainfall between March and April and October through December. Small amounts of rain, no more than approximately 8 -12 in (200-300 mm) per year, provide brief flows for the shallow streams in this region.²⁰³

The region's physical environment has played an important role in shaping the Somali as pastoralists, farmers, and fishermen. It has also increased the vulnerability of the population to drought, hunger, and insecurity. Pastoralist communities often compete for access to water and arable land. Resource scarcity in this region has particularly exacerbated a refugee situation -- the product of a simmering, 20-year civil war in neighboring Somalia. The refugees (who number in the tens of thousands) and local people frequently clash over water, firewood, and food.

This region has no significant flora other than shrubs, bushes, grasses, and acacia trees. Livestock herding and trading are the most common vocations of people living in this region. Traditional national boundaries are often blurred because pastoral communities frequently graze their herds anywhere pasturage is available - even in neighboring countries. Non-state actors often exploit tensions between pastoralists and landowners in order to advance their own personal or group self-interest. The Kenya-Somali border has become a security risk in recent years, with Al-Shabaab orchestrating attacks on the Kenya side of the border.



Refugees queue for water in Dadaab (Source: UNHCR)

The Economy of the Culture

Livestock Trading

The physical environment in NEP challenges the sustainment of viable agriculture, which directly supports livestock trading. A majority of the population is pastoral and is engaged in small-scale agriculture. Traditionally, Somalis have also tended livestock, including cattle, sheep, goats, and camels. The number of livestock an individual possesses is considered a sign of wealth. Livestock trade in this region has sustained communities for decades, as people trade sheep and goats in exchange for grain. This practice extends across the Kenya-Somali border, even in the aftermath of the civil war in Somalia. There are seven major cattle markets in Somalia, including Afmadow and Baidoa in Somalia; all of these markets are connected to the Garissa livestock market in the NEP.²⁰⁴




Camels in northeastern Province are a sign of status and wealth (Source: DVIDS)

“In the pastoralist economy, cross-border cattle marketing and its associated service sector provide a range of employment and income-earning opportunities for cattle owners; cattle herders who trek the cattle to their next destination: cattle branders; cattle traders, buyers and brokers; sellers of fodder and water; veterinary professionals and health services providers; money vendors who facilitate transactions; militias who extort illegal taxes at check points and local authorities who generate revenue through taxation.”²⁰⁵

Livestock Population by Type and County (2009)				
County	Cattle	Sheep	Goats	Camels
Garissa	903,673	1,224,448	2,090,613	236,423
Wajir	794,552	1,406,883	1,866,226	533,651
Mandera	1,076,978	1,632,824	3,919,747	930,819
Total	2,775,203	4,264,155	7,876,586	1,700,893

Source: Kenya Open Data²⁰⁶

The livestock population also supports other significant components of the economy. The Kenyan population consumes approximately 600,000 metric tons of red meat annually, most of which is raised in the country by small-scale producers.²⁰⁷ It is estimated that the livestock sector contributes 5.6-12.5 percent of GDP.²⁰⁸ (In 2013, Kenya's total GDP was estimated at \$55 billion.)²⁰⁹ In NEP alone, livestock sales totaled \$635,000-\$793,000 a week, and contributed significantly to economic development and food security within the region.



Source: Central Bank of Kenya Annual Report (2014)

Another significant economic driver in this region is mining. The construction industry has been the best-performing sector in Kenya since 2002, and contributed 4.8 percent to the GDP in 2013.²¹⁰ This means that the need for raw building material – timber and brick -- has increased. The NEP is a source of construction stone. The NEP has therefore been able to attract labor to work in both the formal and informal mines.²¹¹ Additionally, other sub-sectors have been boosted by the increase in construction and infrastructure output. For example, the transportation sector in the NEP has

seen an increase in revenue as it transports more raw material and additional workers. In fact, Al-Shabaab terror attacks (2014 – 2015) in the NEP frequently targeted commuter buses and stone quarries.

Remittances

Hawala


The conflict in Somalia (1991 to present) resulted in the growth of one of the largest refugee camps in Africa, a place called *Dadaab*. While thousands of refugees were relocated to countries like Norway, Sweden, Canada, and the United States, many of their family members were left behind in the camps. This situation created the need for the Somali community living abroad to use any means possible ("formal" or "informal") to send money (remittances) back to Kenya. Because remote areas of Kenya lack formal banks, an informal system of banking -- *hawala* -- became the most reliable and preferred means to send remittances.²¹² *Hawala* is

Hawala is popular because it is fast, cheap, and reliable. *Hawala* exists outside government regulation; it does not leave any record and is not subject to taxation.

a parallel banking system that exists outside of formal structures.²¹³ *Hawala* relies on trust: families routinely use this system to remit money across distances to family or friends. The Somali diaspora and those living in urban centers in Kenya have relied on *hawala* for decades, building vast networks of money transmitters across the world.

The popularity of *hawala* is due to its cost effectiveness. Low overhead costs and exchange rates in many cases have directly benefited the customers who utilize the service. *Hawala* is also an efficient and reliable means of sending money to family in remote or unstable environments within Somalia.

How *hawala* works



How *hawala* works: Abdul hands money over to Warsame, a *hawala* agent. Warsame calls Mohammed in Nairobi, who calls the recipient (in this case, Abdul's mother), to collect the money. There is no physical transfer of cash between the two agents - both Warsame and Mohammed balance their accounts with multiple incoming and outgoing cash transfers to and from people within their geographical location (Source: CAOCL)

Because *hawala* lacks a paper trail, the government of Kenya is not able to tax or account for the millions that are remitted into the country. Additionally, because most users are anonymous, the risk for illegal transactions is higher. The lack of a paper trail also means that *hawala* can be used for money laundering, which is a key issue -- especially in environments challenged by conflict. This region is especially at risk because of the existence of terror cells in Somalia with access to NEP. Al-Shabaab, a terror group with roots in Somalia, is financed through illegal enterprises, and large sums of money are transmitted throughout their network via *hawala*. In April 2015, the government of Kenya -- reacting to the killing of 148 students during an Al-Shabaab ambush -- shut down 13 money transfer companies in an effort to stem terror financing.²¹⁴ Most of the companies shut down served customers in NEP and in Somalia.

The Refugee Economy

The Dadaab refugee camp is located in Garissa County and hosts close to 350,000 refugees.²¹⁵ Located approximately 55 mi (88 km) from the Somali border, the Dadaab is comprised of four complexes: Ifo, Hagadera, Kambios, and Dagahaley.²¹⁶ Like other refugee camps around the world, the presence of refugees in the NEP has impacted the local economy. Alongside humanitarian aid, which meets the short-term basic needs of refugees, there are hundreds of employment opportunities for the host community: many small- and medium-sized businesses are hired to serve the refugee population.

Humanitarian agencies and NGOs in the area have also contributed to development projects, including medical facilities and schools. Most refugees earn wages outside the camp and through cross-border trade; this enables them to buy foodstuffs from Somalia for resale in the camp. Additionally, many refugees are sustained by remittances received from family members in Kenya's capital, Nairobi, and from abroad. Dahabshiil, a Dubai-based money-transfer company equivalent to Western Union, estimates \$70-\$100 million is remitted into Dadaab from the U.S., Europe, and Somalia every month.²¹⁷ This estimate does not account for the informal cash transfers remitted through *hawala*. Remittances and profits from the small and medium-sized enterprises in this region have been a boon to the local economy, which traditionally relies heavily on money derived from the trade of livestock.



Fuel efficient stoves: Small and medium sized enterprises are major economic drivers in Dadaab (Source: UNHCR)

Despite a generally positive economic outlook, Kenya's informal economy has been impacted by instability in Somalia, which has given rise to cartels that operate in Dadaab and in Garissa County. In Kenya, the sugar industry, in particular, has encountered a series of challenges that have hampered productivity and supply. Increased demand and the undersupply of this commodity have opened up illegal sugar imports over the years. Garissa and Wajir have become sugar transit points, with illegally made sugar transiting from the Somali port of Kismayo across the border into Kenya. Al-Shabaab has also benefited from this illegal trade; it reportedly charges a transit levy on trucks transporting sugar through Somalia to Kenya.²¹⁸ Money earned by Al-Shabaab from these levies are transferred into the coffers of this terror group via informal channels such as *hawala*. The government of Kenya is doing its best to police the informal sector operating around local refugee camps in order to intercept small arms and counteract terror activities; however, the camps remain vulnerable to criminality because of their proximity to the porous border with Somalia.

Eastleigh

Eastleigh, named after a city in England, is a suburb in Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya. Eastleigh grew from a regular residential area in the 1970s and 1980s into a commercial district with wholesale and retail outlets that service the greater East Africa region. Most of the businesses operating in Eastleigh are run by the Somali community.

When the conflict in Somalia broke out in 1991, Eastleigh became the transit hub for affluent Somalis who were able to evade the refugee camps. As more and more refugees found their way out of the camps and resettled in the West, they opened businesses to support their extended families in Kenya. Today, Eastleigh is often referred to as "Little Mogadishu"; this is because it serves as a hub for the Somali diaspora returning from other parts of the region and the West.



A wholesale trader in Eastleigh. (Source: Wikipedia)

Eastleigh is very important to the economy of the NEP. Any Somali who makes their way to Eastleigh from the NEP is almost guaranteed to tap into a national, regional, and international trade network.

Many Somalis operating businesses in Eastleigh hold passports from countries like Canada and Norway. Most *hawala* transfers of cash from overseas into Kenya are channeled through Eastleigh. *Khat*, a leafy stimulant that is classified as an illegal drug in the West (but is widely used in the NEP and in Somalia), is also channeled through Eastleigh. The trade in *khat* is a million-dollar industry. Because using *khat* is not illegal in Kenya, it generates close to \$18 million a year in tax revenue.²¹⁹

Somalis living in the NEP buy domestic and business supplies from Eastleigh. Similarly, Somalis who visit their homeland of Somalia stopover in Eastleigh before proceeding on to Somalia. Additionally, because most often their stay in Somalia is short, they return to spend the rest of their vacation in Eastleigh before returning to the West.

Social Structure

Clannism


The Somali people, irrespective of national borders, are a cohesive group: they share a common ancestry. Being aware of this trait will enable better understanding of the Somali people and their culture.²²⁰

The Somali people are organized in clans that overlap territories. Historically, smaller clans have affiliated with larger, more powerful ones in order to enhance access to grazing lands and the opportunity to trade goods with a broader base of consumers.

There are six main Somali clan families: the *Daarood*, *Hawiye*, *Isaaq*, and *Dir* clans, whose main economic activity and way of life is centered on pastoralism; and the *Digil* and *Rahanwayn* clans, whose lifestyle and economy is centered on agriculture.²²¹

There are several subclans that fall under the main groupings. These subclans are based on both patrilineal descent and socio-economic links, such as the need to share a pastoral lifestyle. For example, the four main pastoralist clans claim a common ancestor, *Samaale*, while the *Digil* and *Rahanwayn* clans are linked by their socio-economic inclination to agriculture. Although the *Digil* and

Rahanwayn acknowledge *Samaale* as the father of the Somali, they do not trace their patrilineal lineage to *Samaale*.²²²



Somali Clan Families (Source: Library of Congress)

The *Digil* and *Rahanwayn* are linked by oral contract, obliging them to share responsibility in paying “blood money” when there is such a requirement under customary law (*Xeer*).²²³ Because of this, they are known as a *Diya*-paying (“blood-paying”) group. “Blood money” refers to a comprehensive compensation and reconciliation method under Somali traditional law; “blood money” is paid as restitution for loss of life, injury, or some other misconduct. The restitution is given in the form of money -- “blood wealth” -- or animals. If “blood money” is being paid for a wrongful death, it is usually given to the surviving kin of the deceased.²²⁴

Although there is a sense of “Somali consciousness” centered on a common language, culture, religion, and mode of dress; the division depicted by their genealogy frames the relationship between the clans.

Generic traits unite the clans; yet deeper, distinct issues split them. Many times, these differences are the root cause of conflict. For example, the *Digil* and *Rahanwayn* are referred to as *Sab*, which is considered derogatory. *Sab* is used to underscore the inability of these clans to assimilate into the pastoral lifestyle (about 70 percent of the Somali people are pastoralists).²²⁵ Among these pastoral clans, the search for pasture has forced many clans to venture into other parts of the country. Today, the Somali people are spread out across many parts of Kenya; they have even migrated to the country’s coastal belt and larger cities.

Family

The Somali social structure is organized around family; however, the Somali concept of family is different from the Western concept. Among Somalis, greater emphasis is placed on the extended family and on the clan.

Within Somali society, the smallest unit is the family; the largest unit is the clan. A clan consists of members of the same ancestral line, with each family being able to map their kinship ties through the patriarchal lineage.

Although urbanization and migration have impacted the family unit, Somalis have been able to maintain bonds in spite of geographical separation. For example, Somalis living in Kenya's larger cities often live in clusters that include members of the extended family. The wealthiest patriarch in each family is often expected to support anyone living under his roof. Additionally, because some families are polygamous, the reach of the family is wider than that of families in the West. One family can have over ten members, excluding members of the extended family, living in the same home. Overall, family bonds make community bonds stronger, and it is common for neighbors or relatives to keep an eye out for (and even discipline) a child who is not theirs.

Clan and sub-clan membership also defines family structure and lifestyle. For example, a *Darwood*-centric clan will practice pastoralism, while a *Digil*-centered clan will rely on agriculture. Family and clan are the two most important units in the Somali social structure, unlike the rest of Kenya.

A common greeting among non-Somali tribes in Kenya -- “Where are you from?” -- references their area of origin. Whereas, Somalis will ask: “Whom are you from?” referencing their family and clan.²²⁶ Often, members of the same clan share the same values and beliefs; however, because of the role of politics in public life in Kenya, most Somalis in NEP vote as a bloc.

In the past five years, terrorism and radicalization have negatively impacted the NEP. Families have lost productive youth to recruiters from the Al-Shabaab terror group operating in Somalia. Although the Kenyan government is actively campaigning against radicalization, some radicalized young people (particularly youth who have previously fought in Islamic insurgencies outside Kenya) are launching attacks within their own communities. In 2015, Al-Shabaab militants launched an attack on Garissa University in NEP, killing 147 students.²²⁷ One of the attackers was the son of the area chief who had been reported missing in 2013.²²⁸

Marriage

Marriage is an important rite of passage among the Somali because it brings clans together. Although marriages are often arranged, love marriages are not prohibited and are common in urban centers. Marriage is traditionally initiated by a man's family, which must pay a dowry that is dictated by family status and economic conditions. The ties formed after a marital union are also important, as they contribute to

The concept of reciprocity is important in the Somali culture. Bride price is viewed not as payment for the bride, but as gratitude to the bride's family for raising a daughter. Bride price marks the beginning of the relationship between the extended families of the bride and the groom.

conflict resolution, strengthen political alliances, and encourage trade. Weddings are formal events that often engage members of the entire community -- whether they are organizing the festivities, cooking food, or celebrating with the newlyweds at the reception. The community and the extended family are involved in the entire process, from the bride price ceremony to the actual marriage ceremony. Additionally, it is expected that a marriage will lead to the extension of the family line. Having many children is encouraged, as it is seen as a sign of wealth and power.²²⁹

Gender

Among the Somali, males are usually the head of the household. Women traditionally play a secondary, subservient role—at least publicly. Gender also defines labor division. Child rearing is an important

task relegated to women, while men are considered primary breadwinners and engage in labor-intensive tasks. While both sexes participate in the upkeep of the home, women usually specialize in less labor-intensive forms of agriculture and livestock rearing. Traditionally, women are seen as the protected and defended, and men as the providers and the protectors. However, conflict and other factors such as drought and famine in this region have affected traditional gender roles. Today there are many female-headed households.

This region is also host to thousands of refugees who have redefined gender roles. As in most post-conflict environments, gender roles are not as static as they are in traditional societies. Additionally, the absence of formal employment opportunities has diminished the role of men as providers. Thus, the role of women has evolved from that of child-bearer and as keepers of the homestead to provider and protector – especially in the refugee camps. Further, women have bonded together because of the suffering their households have experienced. Somali women form the informal social welfare system as caregivers in their communities. Additionally, many women have had to assume a broader decision-making role, especially in female-led refugee households. Furthermore, many women in this region have been victims of violence. This is especially true in Somali refugee camps, where women and girls (who have often arrived at these camps seeking sanctuary from regional conflicts) sometimes find themselves the victims of violent acts, including rape.

Generalized reciprocity in Somali society can be seen in the division of labor between the sexes. The work of both genders contributes to the common good, and no one expects to be compensated directly for their contributions.

In *Dadaab*, where the social structure is loose and the community support network is lacking, women are often targeted by corrupt officials who withhold food and other basic supplies. (There are also reports that some of these corrupt officials have forced *Dadaab* women to submit to rape.)²³⁰ Further, rape is treated as a minor crime and is rarely investigated with the intent to prosecute. This attitude exposes more women to violence in the community, especially in the *Dadaab* refugee camp.

Ironically, rape is considered a serious crime in Somali culture, where a woman's purity is highly safeguarded. Rape introduces a social stigma and subjects victims to rituals such as female genital mutilation (FGM) to "restore their purity."²³¹ In Kenya, the form of FGM practices to "restore purity" is -- called infibulation, where a woman's genital labia are stitched together. In instances of rape, infibulation frequently causes victims to suffer additional pain and long-term medical issues.

Although the government of Kenya has criminalized rape and traditional practices like FGM, enforcement is lacking. There are efforts on several fronts to sensitize communities about the harmful effects of FGM -- and, it is hoped, to eventually eradicate these practices. Advocacy efforts in this region have been at the forefront of changing attitudes and practices that negatively impact gender roles and society. As a result, there is now, generally, a more conducive environment for dialogue about how to curb this practice.

Language

Somali is the primary language spoken by the Somali community in NEP. It is a key unifying feature among the various Somali people in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.

The Somali language is written in the Roman alphabet; it is the primary language of instruction in early learning in rural areas in NEP. Somali is used to teach and instruct children in primary school, but it is not taught as a subject. Thus, Somali fluency and literacy levels are low in this region. Although most people in NEP are considered fluent in Somali, their “fluency” is due to the fact that Somali is their mother tongue. However, this may change as the Kenyan government enhances curriculum at the national level and mandates non-fee-based primary education.

Language often serves as a mobilization tool. In the NEP, the common use of Somali strengthens ties with Somali nationals across the Somali border. Language has fostered trade between communities, even as other ethnic groups struggled economically.

In addition to Somali, the other dominant languages spoken in this region are Swahili and English. Both languages are taught as children advance through school. English is the principle medium of instruction in secondary schools in this region. Swahili, along with English, is used in government offices and the workplace.

Political Structure

Historically, the Somali political structure has been based on the clan structure, with the more powerful clans ruling over the smaller, less powerful ones. This clan-based social structure did not have a clearly defined political structure; often, elders in each clan provided leadership alongside the Sultan, who was the head of the clan. Decision-making was centralized, with a council of elders responsible for resolving conflicts between families and clans.

Elders (*oday*) were typically older males, although wealth and prestige also played a role in how elders were perceived in the council of elders. This is because wealth typically facilitates easier access to funds in support of a cause. More importantly, because a wealthy man was financially responsible for the well-being of his kinsmen, his kinsmen would reciprocate by favoring his position on issues brought up to the community for consensus. Factors that elevated the status and influence of an individual in the council of elders included political acumen, religious knowledge, oratory skills, and whether they had made the Muslim pilgrimage (*Hajj*) to Mecca.²³² Although religious leaders were supposed to remain neutral and seldom took part in political affairs, their opinions were often weighted more heavily during the council of elders meetings. Since there was no formal body with administrative functions, the council of elders would meet whenever a pressing need arose.

Today, the Somali operate within both formal and informal political structures. Formal structures are part of the national apparatus for representation and accountability. Informal structures are centered on the traditional forms of governance described above, which were inherited from former generations. In this region, informal governing structures are often more important than formal structures. Due to the infiltration of terror cells in communities in this region, the government has had to rely even more on informal political structures to stem the radicalization of youth. Traditional leaders are accessible, respected, and considered more legitimate than government representatives, which makes them valuable stakeholders in maintaining law, order, peace, and security in this region.

Kenya is divided into nine provinces, including NEP, and 47 counties. Warjir, Garissa, and Mandera are counties in the NEP, and each is headed by a governor, who is the executive manager of the

county. There is also a legislative branch with counselors elected to represent a ward. (A ward is a small administrative unit within a county).

The national government also maintains a presence at the village level through the administrative office of the chief. The chief is an apolitical administrative official appointed and trained by the national government. He is the official representative of the national government at the local level and serves as the bridge between the county government and the national government. This office was formalized after Kenya's independence and its official function is to maintain order, issue licenses for public events, and ensure the general safety of the constituency. The chief coordinates national programs, including emergency response, and works alongside the police to maintain order within the county. The chief also works with the informal leadership to resolve conflicts. The chief updates informal leaders about national government initiatives that could have a significant impact at the local level.



Chiefs have an official role in Kenya (Source: Giraffe Heroes Project)

Belief Systems

The Somali belief system is built on a combination of religion, the family and clan structure, and a Somali identity that surpasses borders. There is what is seen as a “Somaliness” that distinguishes Somalis from other ethnic groups in the NEP -- particularly in Borana and Rendille ethnic groups.

The Somali have a distinct mode of dress, a written language, and a vibrant trading culture that has sustained the group for hundreds of years. Like the Maasai of Kenya, the Somali have a hair dye and perfume that sets them apart from other ethnic groups in Kenya. Because of the location of Kenya in the Horn of Africa, with its proximity to the Indian Ocean, the Somali have historically maintained close trade ties with the Arab world. These ties are responsible for the adoption of Islam and brought goods, such as silk that has become part of their identity. This identity has been preserved through poetry, a significant part of the Somali way of life. Poets are highly regarded in Somali culture for their wisdom and literary prowess.

Although religion defines the belief system of the Somali, their beliefs are also rooted in the clan structure, trade relations, and the pastoral lifestyle. Values that are evident in Somali communities include respect for elders, preservation of the extended family unit, and a deep value for mutual respect based on trust. Among the Somali, trust is highly valued and has sustained commerce within the clans and with outside groups for hundreds of years.

Islam

Before the demarcation of Africa's borders at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), the Somali people -- as did most populations residing on the Indian Ocean coastline -- began trading with Arabs. This trade brought with it formal Islamic practices. The pastoralist way of life disseminated Islam further. There are some scholars who believe that the practice of Islam among the Somali predates the appearance of Arab traders, citing the arrival in Somalia of the three Muslim patriarchs -- Shayakh

Daarod Jabarti, Shayakh Isahaaq, and Shayakh Isaaq -- sometime between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries.²³³ Daarod, Isahaaq and Isaaq are the patriarchs of Somali clan families, and are said to have introduced Islam to Somalia,²³⁴ which in turn spread to what is modern-day NEP.

The Somali population in NEP follows Sunni Islam. Both Sunni and Shi'a sects agree on the fundamentals of their common faith, but each sect fervently believes that its own path is the truest approach to the divine.²³⁵ Islam split into these two branches over a religious-political leadership dispute, particularly about the rightful successor of Mohammed, following his death.²³⁶

Sunni: the name comes from *Ahl Al-Sunna wal Jamma'a*, which means "people of the Sunna and the community." The word **Sunna** in Arabic means "path" or "habitual practice"; it is the conduct and the way of life for Muslims based on the sayings, teachings, and practices of the prophet of Islam, Mohammed.

Following Mohammed's death, Abu Bakr, Mohammed's father-in-law and close friend, emerged as the commander of the faithful, or what is known as the Rightly Guided Caliph ("*Khulafa'a Al-Rashidun*"). The next caliph was Omar Ibn Al-Khattab; the third was Uthman Ibn Affan; Ali Ibn Abitalib, Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law, was the fourth caliph.

Controversy over Ali Ibn Abitalib incited the Sunni-Shi'a split. While Shi'a believe that Ali Ibn Abitalib was the only divinely designated "*imam caliph*" (religious leader) following Mohammed's death, Sunnis maintain the first three caliphs after Mohammed were also legitimate religious leaders, and that Ali Ibn Abitalib was the last of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs.

Shi'a: the name is shortened from the historical name *Shi'a-t-Ali*, which means the followers of Ali Ibn Abitalib or the party of Ali Ibn Abitalib.

Ali's supporters, the Shi'a, believe that he should have been named the first caliph, and that he was Mohammed's infallible, divinely appointed, and true successor. They held that the caliphate should pass down only to direct male descendants of Ali Ibn Abitalib and his wife Fatima, Mohammed's daughter. However, Sunni view Ali Ibn Abitalib as merely the last of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, believing that Mohammed intended for Muslims to choose a successor by consensus.

Over the years, the political divide between the two sects broadened and deepened, from a simple political-leadership disagreement, to a theological debate over religious interpretations and practices. Sunni Islam has four schools of Islamic doctrine and law (jurisprudence): *Hanafi*, *Maliki*, *Shafi'i*, and *Hanbali*.

Sunnis can choose to follow any one of these schools of jurisprudence. Shi'a follow one Islamic doctrine, which is the *Ja'afari* or the Twelver. Twelver is derived from what Shi'a believe are the twelve divine imams who are the direct male descendants of Ali Ibn Abitalib and Fatima. The Twelver Islamic doctrine is also known as *Imamiya*, derived from the word imam.

Sunnis strictly follow the Qur'an and the unique interpretation of the *hadith* (recorded oral traditions of Mohammed) through their respective schools of jurisprudence; whereas, Shi'a follow the Qur'an and the teachings and recorded traditions of their twelve imams, also known as *Ahl Al-Bayt* (family of Mohammed). Shi'a scholars use *ijtihad* (reasoning), while Sunni rely on the sourced *hadith* and Sunna.

Hadith: record of the collection of traditions containing sayings of the prophet of Islam Mohammed.

Both sects have different views of acceptable schools of Islamic jurisprudence and who is the legitimate Islamic authority. Many practicing Muslims in NEP are tolerant of people from either Islamic sect. However, youth radicalization in the region has resulted in the recruitment of young people into the Al-Shabaab terror cells; these recruits pose a threat to Islam as it is practiced in NEP. Mosques in the NEP are heavily policed, especially since the 2015 Garissa University attacks. Unlike other terrorist attacks in Kenya, the Garissa University attack was significant because the attackers had links to the community and had been attending prayers at a local mosque.

Conclusion

You might have noticed that the case study does not include all, or even many, of the concepts discussed in the Operational Culture General document. This is only natural; a comprehensive body of literature devoted to the study of a single culture is rare. In fact, Marines are frequently called upon to operate in areas where current information on local culture is scarce. What the OCG and the chapters in this document do is help Marines learn about their assigned region and acquire skills and concepts that will assist them in operating effectively in complex cross-cultural situations in any part of the globe when information is scarce or rapidly changing.

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